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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Almost all economic activities and real life decisions take place under uncer-
tainty. The future payoff often depends on an uncertain state of the world
realized after the decision has been made. First models on decision mak-
ing in presence of uncertainty proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) and Savage (1954) assume that there exists a unique probability over
possible states of the world. An act is to be preferred to an alternative one if
the expected utility of the first one exceeds the expected utility of the second
evaluated under a certain probability measure. The question arises however
on how to find the probability in question. This seems to be an easy task
while gambling in the casino, tossing a coin or in similar lab like situations.
Here, the exact probability is known and the situation bears only risk. In
more complex situations the right pick is not that easy anymore. Assigning
a probability to the event that Germany wins the next world cup includes
accounting for contingencies that are far beyond subject’s understanding and
is a task impossible to be accomplished. While a casino bet is risky, Germany
winning the World Cup is uncertain.
The distinction between risk and uncertainty was first discussed by Knight
1.1. KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY
(1921) and is now referred to as ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty 1.
1.1 Knightian Uncertainty
In his seminal book Knight (1921) suggests that there exist random outcomes
which cannot be represented by numerical probabilities, i.e. he establishes a
clear distinction between measurable uncertainty he calls risk and unmeasur-
able uncertainty. Although in later version of his famous book he concludes
that modeling real world decisions with economic models is hardly possible
his ideas gave rise to a strand of literature on modeling unknown unknowns.
Ellsberg (1961) constructs an urn experiment in which agents make choices
that systematically violate the axioms of expected utility. In the experiment
in which probabilities of outcomes are not given completely, participants pre-
fer to bet on outcomes with known probability and systematically refuse to
bet on outcomes where probabilities of winning are not given. Behaving this
way they make choices that make it impossible to attach probabilities to out-
comes in the way prescribed by Savage (1954). This observation suggests that
agents not only care about relative likelihood of obtaining a payoff but also
about ambiguity attached to it. The work of Ellsberg (1961) first challenges
the prevailing subjective expected utility (SEU) paradigm by disentangling
aversion to lack of knowledge of future outcomes from the aversion to lack of
knowledge of its odds. Several attempts has been made to rationalize choices
made by Ellsberg agents. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) set up axioms for
preferences which lead to Maxmin Expected Utility or the Multiple Priors
Model by weakening the Sure Thing principle of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) and add an axiom that captures Uncertainty Aversion to the model.
These axioms lead to a representation in which a single prior used in classical
models to compute the expected utility needs to be replaced by a whole set
1In the following we use terms ambiguity and uncertainty interchangeably meaning the
same.
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of possible distributions.
Epstein and Schneider (2003b) modify the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
axioms to extend the model to a dynamical setting. To do so they modify
the preference relation to be time and state dependent and add the dynamic
consistency axiom to the preferences. Loosely speaking, dynamic consistency
requires that decisions made at a node are still optimal from the perspective
of later nodes. The resulting representation is the so called multiple prior
recursive utility. As in the static setting the expectation is taken with re-
spect to a set of priors. However, not every set of measures can arise in the
representation but only sets satisfying a certain regularity condition. The
restriction on the set of priors steams from the dynamic consistency axiom
imposed on the preferences and will be discussed later.
Heuristically, the use of a set of measures instead of one captures the
inability of the decision maker to assign concrete probabilities. She expresses
her aversion to this uncertainty by putting more weight on states unfavorable
to her and thus considering the minimal expected utility over all possible
probabilities. As a result the ambiguity averse preferences assign utilities
in very conservative and cautious manner by only considering the minimal
expected utility of a future payoff.
Several authors work on different approaches to rationalize ambiguity
averse behavior. Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) employ a
multiple prior approach but account for plausibility of different models by pe-
nalizing models that the agents considers as unlikely, Schmeidler (1989) uses
a non-additive measure notion to capture ambiguity, Bewley (2002) relaxes
completeness maintaining independence, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005) choose a smooth ambiguity approach by disentangling ambiguity from
the attitude towards it.
While previous works are all preference based there also have been at-
tempts to formalize robust behavior in other economic disciplines. Hansen
3
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and Sargent (2001) introduce the notion of robust control in macroeconomics,
another strand in the literature which is mathematically equivalent to the
multiple prior utility sketched above is the coherent risk measures approach
introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999).
By providing a solid decision theoretical ground works of above mentioned
authors gave rise to a strand of literature analyzing the consequences of
these preferences for predictions of classical economic models. The second
generation of literature on ambiguity aversion discussed real world problems
under uncertainty.
1.2 Ambiguity in Real Life Applications
1.2.1 Modeling Uncertainty
Decision theoretical models discussed above take the uncertainty as given
and abstract from its source and the exact structure of the set of possible
models. In his experiment Ellsberg generically imposes ambiguity by not
disclosing the decomposition of the urn. The situation is not that clear in
real world applications since there is information available that allows to draw
conclusions about the odds. The existence and the structure of uncertainty
is the first challenge to overcome while modeling meaningful multiple prior
models.
A frequent objection of critics of multiple prior models is the argument of
learning. A rational agent learns from past observations and infer the right
model from data using common filtering methods. As the data set grows
large by the Law of Large Numbers empirical frequencies converge to the
right probability making multiple prior approach obsolete.
There are several reasons why this reasoning does not fully capture the
reality. From subjective perspective individual investor might lack knowledge
and information needed to infer the right probability model or just not own
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powerful machines to deal with the data. Knowing that she is not able to
interpret the information available to her, she thus prefers to use a set of
models. She might also take into account not only her subjective forecasts
but also opinions of experts available on the market.
Even if we take the stand of a more sophisticated agent such as a large
bank there are still good reasons for ambiguity. The ongoing financial crisis
spectacularly demonstrated how excessive confidence in models used by banks
can lead to a disaster and revealed a knew source of uncertainty that had been
mainly ignored before the crisis – the model uncertainty. It arises due to the
impossibility to completely express the reality through abstract models and
is greatly amplified by the complexity of modern quantitative models used in
finance. In these situations minimax expected utility seems an appropriate
choice. Since the value of the portfolio strongly depends on the chosen model
more robust decision making procedure is desirable.
By setting up a meaningful multiple prior model one still has to be careful
when choosing the size of the set of measures since the degree of uncertainty
captured by this set strongly affects predictions of the model. A natural way
to choose the set of models is to consider sets of measures that are statistically
close and thus hard to distinguish from a series of observations as proposed
by Kogan and Wang (2002). One then chooses a confidence level and consid-
ers all models that cannot be distinguished at this confidence level. Another
way is to consider all models consistent with current market conditions such
as bid-ask spread or regulations routines imposed by authorities. The wast
majority of models we are considering stick to one of above mentioned tech-
niques while modeling ambiguity. It is noteworthy however, that the way one
sets up the multiple prior structure can drastically impact prediction of the
model.
In what follows we will give a short overview on multiple prior models of
financial markets. The main focus will lie on optimal stopping problems that
arise in the context of American options and on asset pricing and allocation
5
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under ambiguity.
1.2.2 Ambiguity and Optimal Stopping Problems
Optimal Stopping Problems arise in economics as right timing is often crucial
for realizing a profit opportunity. This might be launching a new product
before your opponent does, selling a house at a good price or hiring the right
person for a given job. The classical solution formulated by Snell (1952) relies
heavily on the specification of the probability space and imposes a fixed prior
over future payoffs. Riedel (2009) generalizes the method of backward induc-
tion in order to account for uncertainty by using a set of measures instead of
one. The regularity condition that already appeared in Epstein and Schnei-
der (2003b) also plays a crucial role here. Formulated in a slightly different
though equivalent way it ensures that the Law of Iterated Expectations still
holds true and thus allows dynamic programming reasoning. Mathematically,
the assumption imposed on the set of priors is equivalent to the stability of
the set of measures under cutting and pasting them together. Intuitively
speaking time-consistency ensures that the decision maker can change his
mind in every period about which measure he thinks is the true one or the
worst one. Time-consistency guarantees that this measure which might be
time- and state-dependent is contained in the set of her possible measures.
This implies that as time passes she will never regret his previous decisions
since at every point in time he can decide optimally. The concept has also
been discussed by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), Delbaen (2002). A brief review
of different concepts along with a proof of equivalence can be found in Riedel
(2009).
Given time-consistency assumption the ideas of Snell (1952) carry over:
the value function can be formulated in a similar way through Snell envelope,
the optimal stopping times have similar form. This allows to solve much
more complicated problems of multiple prior optimal stopping using familiar
6
1.2. AMBIGUITY IN REAL LIFE APPLICATIONS
techniques of dynamic programing. As in the classical version the backward
induction techniques provides the optimal stopping strategy and assigns value
to the problem. However, the multiple prior structure drastically increases
the computational complexity of the model since a set of expectations has to
be computed instead of a single one in every step. This complexity can be
reduced by exploiting a duality result already appeared in Karatzas and Kou
(1998): the multiple prior stopping problem can be reduced to a single prior
problem for a specific measure, the so called worst-case measure. Several
papers use this technique to tackle multiple prior stopping problems.
In an early paper Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) studied the effects of
Knightian uncertainty on job search in a discrete model and provided a closed
form solution for the optimal reservation wage. Several examples of optimal
stopping problems under uncertainty can be found in Riedel (2009). He
shows that ambiguity decreases the value of the option and leads to earlier
stopping for many classes of payoffs.
Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and Kort and Trojanowska (2007) analyze
the firm’s entry and exit decision under uncertainty in continuous time and
show that ambiguity decreases the option value but does not lead to earlier
stopping in general. A similar point has been made by Miao and Wang (2004)
for a slightly more general class of payoffs.
Recently much work has been done on the dynamic models in continuous
time. Mathematical grounds to this go back to Peng (1997) who introduced
the notion of g-expectations. Optimal stopping problems in continuous time
then correspond to Backward Stochastic Differential Equation2.
1.2.3 Ambiguity and Asset Markets
Ambiguity about market conditions or the right market model to use affects
the valuation of investors and thus the choices they makes on a market. As a
2See Riedel (2010) for further references.
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result portfolio allocations in presence of uncertainty structurally differ from
allocations predicted by SEU models. This changes the resulting market
outcomes and helps explaining market anomalies and failures not predicted
by standard SEU models.
While an SEU agent solves a maximization problem when choosing opti-
mal portfolios, an ambiguity averse decision maker solves a maxmin problem
maximizing her minimal expected utility.
First analysis of the qualitative changes of investment behavior under
ambiguity is due to Dow and Werlang (1992). They show that the valuation
of the security depends on the direction of the trade. In a multiple prior
model the investor evaluates a long position according to the lowest return
of this security and short position using the highest return on it. As a result
she only buys the security if the lowest expected return exceeds its price.
Similarly, she shorts the security if the highest return is below the market
price. If the security price lies within the interval of the highest and the
lowest valuation the agent chooses not to trade the asset at all.
A growing body of literature uses this fundamental observation to explain
phenomena observed in reality and not captured by classical models. Epstein
and Miao (2003) assume that the uncertainty about returns on assets on for-
eign company is more pronounced than the uncertainty about home country
stocks and show that this can explain home-bias. Using a similar argument
Boyle and Wang (2009) and Uppal and Wang (2003) explain overinvestment
in the own company and underdiversification.
Epstein and Schneider (2003b), Illeditsch (2009) show that ambiguity
averse investor overreacts to bad news and underreact to good news again
underpinning the pessimistic attitude of the preferences. In extreme case the
optimal portfolio exhibits inertia not reacting to the changes of fundamentals
at all for a range of parameters.
Moreover, while non-participation is never optimal for an SEU investor
it arises naturally if there is ambiguity about expected returns due to the
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existence of the no-trade interval. Epstein and Chen (2002) observed non-
participation in a dynamical Lucas-style model, Cao, Wang, and Zhang
(2005) and Ui (2009) studied endogenous participation in a static model with
investors differing in their degree of ambiguity. Mukerji and Tallon (2001)
show that no-trade decision can generate incompleteness of the market en-
dogenously.
A large body of literature including many studies mentioned above approaches
optimal asset allocation under ambiguity by employing a mean-variance anal-
ysis. Maenhout (2004) shows that uncertainty decreases the portfolio weight
of risky assets. In a model where ambiguity is generated by different opinions
of experts advising the investor Lutgens and Schotman (2010) point out that
the portfolio weights are more stable compared to portfolios resulting in a
single prior model.
Most of the works discussed above take the prices of securities as given.
However, portfolio decisions impact the aggregate demand and supply of the
security and thus prices. Among others Epstein and Chen (2002), Cao, Wang,
and Zhang (2005), study asset pricing and resulting equity premia on markets
with ambiguity. Epstein and Schneider (2003b) point out that ambiguity
aversion can explain a part of the premium puzzle since it acts as extra risk
aversion, Routledge and Zin (2009) shows that ambiguity generates illiquidity
increasing the bid-ask spread. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) point out
that an increase in ambiguity about asset returns may induce flights to quality
causing distress in the market for the ambiguous security. The leitmotiv of
papers cited here is that ambiguity makes the asset less attractive. As a
result investors require a higher premium for holding the asset and sell it if
ambiguity becomes to severe.
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1.3 The Aim of this Work
As mentioned above a common theme in the literature is that ambiguity
averse preferences enforce a more conservative and cautious behavior. Am-
biguity averse decision maker aims to reduce their exposure to uncertainty
by preferring safer payoffs to risky/uncertain ones. For example, an ambi-
guity averse seller of a house accepts a lower bid for the house instead of
waiting for uncertain (in his mind likely dark) future to come. The reason
for the lower reservation bid is the use of the worst-case model for the future
bid distribution – the model that gives him the lowest expected utility. The
worst-case measure in this example is intuitive and easy to identify: choosing
the prior that puts more weight on low bids at every node of the decision
tree minimizes the utility over the whole set of models. Although the set of
beliefs can be very complicated the decision maker here uses a rather simple
one, sticking to it once chosen. He then acts as an SEU maximizer (although
a very pessimistic one) and his optimal strategy follows by means of clas-
sical backward induction making the complex machinery of multiple prior
backward induction and cautious modeling of the set of beliefs obsolete.3
This observation lead to a long standing belief that ambiguity aversion
is just a form of risk aversion and its effects are observationally equivalent
to risk aversion patterns. However, the hypothesis that every ambiguity
averse decision maker acts as an SEU maximizer for an appropriately chosen
measure that can be identified a priori is not true in general. The ability to
reduce the above problem to a SEU problem for a fixed deterministic measure
relies heavily on the structure of the payoff processes one considers.
The first objective of this work is to take a closer look at the key factors
that ensure the simple deterministic form of the worst-case measure and to
provide examples for payoffs where the worst-case measure is non determin-
3 Riedel (2009) provides an extensive analysis of such problems which he calls monotone.
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istic. Then, the worst-case measure changes over time as the state process
is realized and the simple reduction argument used above fails to work. Ba-
sically, the simplicity of the worst-case measure in examples studied in the
literature so far grounds on three assumptions: measurability, monotonic-
ity and Markovian structure of the payoff process. We show that relaxing
those assumptions generates stochastic worst-case measures that depend on
the whole history of the process. We illustrate this fact by analyzing several
exotic American options in a discrete binomial tree model in the spirit of
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). For example, if the effect of uncertainty
changes over time as it is the case for barrier options the worst-case measure
changes with it becoming path dependent. We observe similar effects for
non-monotone payoffs (in the case of straddle) and non-measurable payoffs
(in the case of shout options). In all these examples the worst-case measure
that the decision maker uses is not known a priori and the problem cannot be
reduced to an SEU problem. Here, we can distinguish an ambiguity averse
decision maker from an extremely pessimistic SEU maximizer by choices he
makes while exercising the option.
A second fact widely assumed in the literature is that ambiguity aver-
sion by making the future less valuable leads to earlier stopping. In the
above example of the house selling as in the job search example analyzed
by Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) an increase in ambiguity decreases the bid
/the reservation wage that is accepted by the agent. In this sense the agents
stops earlier. To test the hypothesis of earlier stopping we model and solve a
best choice problem first introduced by Gardner (1960) in the multiple prior
framework: An ambiguity averse decision maker aims to choose the best
among a fixed number of applicants that appear sequentially in a random
order. The only information available to the decision maker are the relative
ranks of applicants seen so far. The decision needs to be taken immediately
and once rejected applicants cannot be recalled. The main challenge of the
11
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analysis is to formulate a model that accommodates ambiguity aversion in
a meaningful way. We do so by assuming ambiguity that the probability to
meet a candidate – a relatively top applicant — is not not exactly known but
comes from a specified interval. We show that our model covers the classical
secretary problem, but also other interesting classes of problems. Our main
result is that the stopping rule is simple, i.e. it is optimal to reject a constant
known number of applicants and then to take the first candidate appearing,
as in the case of classical secretary problem discussed by Gardner (1960).
However, unlike examples above an increase in ambiguity does not lead to
earlier stopping in general. The reason for this is that the payoff obtained
from stopping is ambiguous itself. Thus, stopping does not necessarily reduce
ambiguity. As a result it might be optimal to delay stopping to avoid the
ambiguity attached to payoff obtained from stopping.4 Moreover, as with
American options the worst-case measure of the problem is stochastic again
due to the non-measurability of the payoff.
While the first two chapters work along similar lines analyzing optimal de-
cisions in dynamic settings the last chapter changes the perspective. Instead
of analyzing the effects of ambiguity for the decision process of an individual
agent we consider a static partial equilibrium model of an economy where
some agents are ambiguity averse. The question is similar. Many authors
noted that an ambiguity averse investor rather chooses safer assets to avoid
uncertainty while selecting a portfolio. They require an additional premium
to be rewarded for the ambiguity if they hold the ambiguous asset. This
way, one can explain the equity premium puzzle5 or flights from market with
increased ambiguity.6 Again, the suggestion made in the literature is that
4Kort and Trojanowska (2007) made a similar point with a different example.
5See Mehra and Prescott (1985) for the puzzle and Epstein and Wang (1994) for the
model with ambiguity aversion.
6See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007).
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ambiguity aversion ”.. acts as an extra risk aversion...”7 and leads to lower
equilibrium price. Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) were first to notice that in-
creasing the ambiguity aversion can lower equity premium since agents that
require a high ambiguity premium leave the market. As a result the ambigu-
ity premium paid on the market in equilibrium decreases leading to higher
prices. In the last chapter of this work we make a similar point and show
that an increase in ambiguity can lead to lower ambiguity premia if market
participants are heterogeneous. In our model agents differ not only in their
attitude towards uncertainty but also in their beliefs about the return of the
market security. If the divergence of opinions and the degree of ambiguity is
large enough, optimistic investor will demand a large amount of the security.
However, ambiguity averse decision maker will refuse to supply the security
if its price happens to lie in the no-trade interval. The demand of optimistic
agents on the market then drives the premia down due to pronounced de-
mand. We point out that ambiguity not only affects the demand but also the
supply side of the economy. This way, the equity premium can decrease not
because agents stop buying the security but because the agents stop selling
it and thus slacken the supply.
The main chapters of this thesis, each of which self contained in notation,
are based on three articles. The first two consider optimal stopping behavior
of an agent facing uncertainty. Chapter 2 is coauthored with Frank Riedel and
analyzes the best choice problem under uncertainty. Chapter 3 based on a
joint work with Joerg Vorbrink studies the structure of worst-case measures
for several American options. The last chapter of this work changes the
perspective and analyzes overpricing in a static partial equilibrium model.
To this point we have given a brief outline of the general context and
developments which lead to this work. Since the questions and topics treated
in the following chapters differ a more detailed scientific placement of this
7Epstein and Wang (1994)
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work will be discussed in each chapter separately.
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Chapter 2
A Best Choice Problem under
Ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
The classical secretary problem is one of the most popular problems in the
area of Applied Probability, Economics, and related fields. Since its appear-
ance in 1960 a rich variety on extensions and additional features has been
discussed in the scientific1 and popular2 literature.
In the classical secretary problem introduced by Gardner (1960) an em-
ployer sequentially observes N girls3 applying for a secretary job appearing
in a random order. She can only observe the relative rank of the current girl
compared to applicants already observed and has no additional information
on their quality. The applicants can be strictly ordered. Immediately after
1Freeman (1983) gives an overview of the development until the eighties. Ferguson
(1989) contains historical anecdotes. A lot of material is covered in Berezovski and Gnedin
(1984).
2Gardner’s treatment is the first instance here. A most recent example is the treatment
in a book about ”love economics” by a German journalist Beck (2005). It plays also a role
in psychological experiments, see Todd (2009).
3In the following we will use applicant and girl interchangeably meaning applicants of
both sexes.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
the interview the employer has to accept the girl or to continue the observa-
tion. Rejected applicants do not come back. Based on this information the
agent aims to maximize the probability of finding the best girl4.
Most of the classical literature in this field assumes that the girls come
in random order where all orderings are equally likely. The solution is sur-
prisingly nice. It prescribes to reject a known fraction of girls, approximately
1
e
, and to accept afterwards the next candidate, i.e. a girl with relative rank
1. Such stopping rules are called simple. This strategy performs very well:
Indeed, the chance of success is approximately 36, 8% ≈ 1
e
for large N .
This nice and surprising result is based on the strong assumption that
the girls arrive randomly, all possible orderings being equally likely. There
are good reasons to care about the robustness of this assumption. From a
subjective point of view, the decision maker might not feel secure about the
distribution of arrivals — she might face ”ambiguity”. Even if we take a
more objective point of view, we might want to perform a sensitivity analysis
of the optimal rule. While there is certainly a degree of randomness in
such choice situations, it is not obvious that the arrival probability would
be independent of the girl’s quality, e.g. It might well be that more skilled
applicants find open jobs earlier5. In this paper, we present a way of dealing
with these questions by embedding the best choice problem into a multiple
prior framework as introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for the static
case, and extended to dynamic frameworks by Epstein and Schneider (2003b).
The agent works here with a class of possible prior distributions instead of a
single one, and uses the minimax principle to evaluate her payoffs. We use
then the general theory for optimal stopping under ambiguity developed in
4This is an extreme utility function, of course. On the other hand, the analysis based
on this extreme assumption serves as a benchmark for more general utility functions. The
results are usually similar, at least in the Bayesian setting, see Ferguson (2006), e.g.
5Another obvious way of introducing ambiguity concerns the number of applicants.
This question is not pursued here; see Engelage (2009) for a treatment of best choice
problems with an unknown and ambiguous number of applicants.
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Riedel (2009) to analyze the model.
Our main result is that the optimal stopping rule is still simple, or a
cutoff rule. The agent rejects a certain number of girls before picking the
next applicant that is better than all previous ones — in the literature on
best choice problems, such applicants are usually called candidates. The
optimal strategy thus consists in building up a ”database” by checking a
certain number of applicants, and to take the first candidate thereafter6.
We are able to obtain an explicit formula for the optimal threshold that
determines the size of the database.
In best choice problems, ambiguity can lead to earlier or later stopping
compared to the Bayesian case, in contrast to the analysis in Riedel (2009)
where ambiguity leads to earlier stopping. The reason for this is that the
original payoff process in best choice problems is not adapted. Indeed, when
the employer accepts a candidate, she does not know if that candidate is the
best among all applicants. She would have to observe all of them to decide
this question. She thus uses her current (most pessimistic) belief about the
candidate indeed being the best applicant. Two effects work against each
other then. On the one hand, after picking a candidate, the agent’s pessimism
leads her to believe that the probability of better candidates to come is very
high — this effect makes her cautious to stop. On the other hand, before
acceptance, she uses a very low probability for computing the chance of
seeing a candidate. This effect makes her eager to exercise her option. We
illustrate these effects with three classes of examples.
In general, the optimal threshold can be quite different from the classical
case (and in this general sense, the 37 %–rule described above is not robust).
When the highest probability of finding a candidate decays sufficiently fast,
the threshold– number of applicants–ratio can be very close to zero; indeed,
6Optimal stopping rules need not be simple. For example, in the situation with in-
complete information about the number of objects a Bayesian approach does not lead to
simple stopping rules in general, see Presman and Sonin (1975).
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it is independent of the number of applicants for large N . In such a situation,
one has rather an absolute than a relative threshold. Instead of looking at the
first 37 % of applicants, one studies a fixed number of them before choosing
the first relatively top applicant.
On the other hand, if the probability of finding a candidate at time n is in
the interval [ γ
n
, 1
γn
] for some parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), the threshold– number of
applicants–ratio can converge to any positive number between 0 and 1. For
γ → 1, we obtain again the 37 % – rule. In this sense, the classical secretary
problem is robust.
Last not least, we give an example where the ambiguity about applicants
being candidates remains constant over time. This example can be viewed as
the outcome of independent coin tosses with identical ambiguity as described
in Epstein and Schneider (2003a)7. The aim is to pick the last 1 in this series
of zeros and ones. We show that the agent optimally skips all but a finite
number of applicants. In this case, we the ratio converges to 1 for large N .
Different parametrization of this example show that ambiguity can lead to
earlier stopping (when the probability of finding a candidate are known to
be small) as well as later stopping compared to the Bayesian case.
On the modeling side, our approach succeeds in finding a model that
allows to introduce ambiguity into best choice problems. Note that one
has to be careful when introducing ambiguity into dynamic models because
one can easily destroy the dynamic consistency of the model8. To do so,
we reformulate the classical secretary problem in the following way. The
agent observes a sequence of ones and zeros, where 1 stands for ”the current
applicant is the best among the candidates seen so far”. The agent gets the
payoff of 1 if she stops at a 1 and there is no further 1 coming afterwards.
In the secretary problem, the probability of seeing a 1 at time n is 1/n as all
7See also the examples of this type discussed in Riedel (2009).
8See Epstein and Schneider (2003b) for a general discussion of time–consistency in mul-
tiple prior models, and Riedel (2009) for the discussion in an optimal stopping framework.
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orderings are equally likely. We then allow for ambiguity by introducing an
interval [an, bn] for this probability; finally, we construct a time–consistent
model by pasting all these marginal probabilities together as explained in
Epstein and Schneider (2003b).
The analysis of the stopping problem proceeds in three steps. In a first
step, we have to derive an equivalent model with adapted payoffs — note
that the payoff function is not adapted here because the agent’s payoff de-
pends on the events that occur after stopping. We pass to adapted payoffs
by taking conditional expectations prior by prior; it is not at all clear that
this leads to the same ex ante payoff, though. Time–consistency and the
corresponding law of iterated expectations for multiple priors9 ensure this
property. In the second step, we compute explicitly the relevant minimal
conditional expectations. After having stopped, the agent uses the maximal
probability for seeing a 1 afterwards. Intuitively, the agent’s pessimism in-
duces him to suppose that the best candidate is probable to come later after
having committed herself to an applicant. After this, we have arrived at an
optimal stopping problem that can be solved with the methods developed
in Riedel (2009). Indeed, the problem at hand turns out to be a monotone
problem: the worst–case measure can thus be identified as the measure under
which the probabilities of seeing a candidate are minimal (until the time of
stopping, of course). It then remains to solve a classical Bayesian stopping
problem, and we are done.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and
provides the stepwise solution as well as the main theorem. Section 3 contains
three classes of examples that allow to discuss in more detail the effects of
ambiguity in best choice problems.
9See, e.g., Riedel (2009), Lemma 11.
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2.2 Best Choice Problems under Ambiguity
Let us start with formalizing the classical best choice problem in a way that
allows a natural generalization to ambiguity10. In the classical secretary
problem, the agent observes sequentially the relative ranks of applicants, say
R1 = 1 for the first one, R2 ∈ {1, 2} for the second, R3 ∈ {1, 2, 3} for the
third and so on. The random ordering implies that the random variables
(Rn)n≤N are independent11. As we are only interested in finding the best
girl, we can discard all applicants with a relative rank higher than 1, and call
candidates those girls that are relatively top at the moment. Let us introduce
the 0 − 1–valued sequence Yn = 1 if Rn = 1 and Yn = 0 else. The random
variables (Yn) are also independent, of course, and we have
P [Yn = 1] =
1
n
because all permutations are equally likely12.
A simple stopping rule first rejects r− 1 applicants and accepts the next
candidate, if it exists, i.e.
τ(r) = inf {k ≥ r|Yn = 1}
with τ(r) = N if no further candidate appears after applicant r−1. One uses
independence of the (Yn)n≤N and monotonicity of the value function to show
that optimal stopping rules must be simple, see Section 2.2.1 below for the
argument in our context. It then remains to compare the expected success
of the different simple rules. The event that girl n is a candidate and also
the best of all girls means that no further girl has relative rank 1. In terms
of our variables (Yn)n≤N , this means that Yn = 1 and Yk = 0 for all k > n.
10A similar treatment of the classical secretary problem is due to Bruss (2000)
11See Ferguson (2006) or Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund (1971) for the technical details.
12Note that the independence of relative ranks ensures that we do not loose information
by conditioning on the σ-algebra generated by (Yn)n≤N instead of (Rn)n≤N .
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The success of a simple strategy is then
φ(r) := P [τ(r) picks the best girl] =
N∑
n=r
P [τ(r) = n, girl n is best]
=
N∑
n=r
P [Yr = 0, . . . , Yn−1 = 0, Yn = 1, Yk = 0, k > n]
=
N∑
n=r
N∏
j=r
P [Yj = 0]
P [Yn = 1]
P [Yn = 0]
=
N∏
j=r
j − 1
j
N∑
n=r
1/n
1− 1/n =
r − 1
N
N∑
n=r
1
n− 1 .
The sum approximates the integral of 1/x, so the value is approximately
φ(r) =
r − 1
N
log
N
r − 1 .
The maximum of the function −x log x is in 1/e, so we conclude that the
optimal r is approximately [N/e] + 1.
2.2.1 Best Choice under Ambiguity
Formulation of the Problem
We generalize now the above model to ambiguity by allowing that the prob-
abilities
P [Yn = 1|Y1, . . . , Yn−1] ∈ [an, bn]
for all histories Y1, . . . , Yn−1 come from an interval instead of being a known
number. Throughout the paper, we assume that 0 < an ≤ bn < 1. Note
that the bounds on conditional probabilities an, bn are allowed to depend on
time, but not on the realized path. For example, more skilled applicants are
likely to apply sooner. If you think of the search where the hiring executive is
visiting several universities while looking for the secretary, she might adjust
her beliefs about meeting a skilled applicant depending on the university she
21
2.2. BEST CHOICE PROBLEMS UNDER AMBIGUITY
is visiting. In the classical problem the probability of finding a top applicant
also varies with time, there we have
P [Yn = 1|Y1, . . . , Yn−1] = an = bn = 1
n
.
Modeling ambiguity in dynamic settings requires some care if one wants
to avoid traps and inconsistencies. We view the random variables (Yn)n≤N
as outcomes of independent, but ambiguous experiments where in the nth
experiment the distribution of Yn, i.e. the number P [Yn = 1] is only known to
come from an interval [an, bn]. From these marginal distributions, the agent
has to construct all possible joint distributions for the sequence (Yn)n≤N .
She does so by choosing any number pn ∈ [an, bn] after having observed
Y1, . . . , Yn−1. A possible prior then takes the form
P [Y1 = 1] = 1 (2.1)
because the first applicant is always a candidate, and
P [Yn = 1|Y1, . . . , Yn−1] = pn ∈ [an, bn] (2.2)
for a predictable sequence of one–step–ahead probabilities pn. Note that we
allow pn to depend on the past realizations of (Y1, . . . , Yn−1). For a time–
consistent worst–case analysis this is important because different one–step–
ahead probabilities might describe the worst case after different histories.
From now on, we work with class P of all probability measures that satisfy
(2.1) and (2.2) for a given sequence 0 < an ≤ bn < 1, n = 1, . . . , N . For
more on the foundations of dynamic decisions under ambiguity, we refer the
reader to Epstein and Schneider (2003b) and Epstein and Schneider (2003a),
see also Riedel (2009).
The astute reader might now wonder why we speak about independent
realizations if the conditional probabilities are allowed to depend on past
observations. Independence in a multiple prior setting is to be understood in
the sense that the interval [an, bn] is independent of past observations, just as
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it means that the conditional probability of the event {Yn = 1} given the past
observations is independent of these observations in classical probability. In
this sense, the agent does not learn from past observations about the degree
of ambiguity of the nth experiment.
We are now ready to formulate our optimization problem. Based on the
available information the agent chooses a stopping rule τ ≤ N that maximizes
the expected payoff which is 1 if she happens to find the best girl, and 0 else.
A way to describe this in our model is as follows: applicant n is the best if
she is a candidate (she has to be relatively best among the first n), and if she
is not topped by any subsequent applicant: in other words, we have Yn = 1
and there is no further candidate afterwards, or Yk = 0 for k > n. Let us
define
Zn =
{
1 if Yn = 1, Yk = 0, k > n
0 else
.
The agent aims to choose a stopping rule τ that maximizes
inf
P∈P
EP [Zτ ]. (2.3)
Reformulation in Adapted Payoffs
The next problem that we face is that the sequence (Zn)n≤N is not adapted
to the filtration generated by the sequence (Yn)n≤N because we do not know
at the time when we pick an applicant if she is best or not. As in the
classical case, we therefore take first conditional expectations of the rewards
(Zn)n≤N before we can apply the machinery of optimal stopping theory. In
the multiple prior framework we thus consider
Xn = ess inf
P∈P
E[Zn|Fn] .
where Fn = σ(Y1, . . . , Yn). In the Bayesian framework, it is relatively easy to
show that the expected payoffs E[Zτ ] = E[Xτ ] are the same for all stopping
times τ . In the multiple prior framework, this is less obvious. Indeed, the
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identity
inf
P∈P
EP [Zτ ] = inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ]
does require a condition on the set of priors which has become known as
rectangularity or m–stability. In our model, this condition is satisfied13, and
we have
Lemma 1. For all stopping times τ ≤ N we have
inf
P∈P
EP [Zτ ] = inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ].
We can thus reformulate our problem as
maximize inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] (2.4)
over all stopping times τ ≤ N .
Reduction to a Monotone Problem
We are now in the position to apply the general theory of optimal stop-
ping with multiple priors as developed in Riedel (2009). To this end, let
us first have a closer look at the payoffs (Xn)n≤N . It is clear that Xn = 0
if we do not have a candidate at n, i.e. Yn = 0, so we need only to focus
on the case Yn = 1. We are then interested in the minimal (conditional)
probability that all subsequent applicants are no candidates. It is quite plau-
sible (but requires a proof, of course) that the probability is minimal under
the measure P¯ where the probabilities for being a candidate are maximal,
P¯ [Yn = 1|Y1, . . . , Yn−1] = bn. Under this measure, the (Yn)n≤N are indepen-
dent (because the conditional probabilities for Yn = 1 are independent of
past observations, but see the proof of Lemma 2 for the details), and we thus
have
13Compare Epstein and Schneider (2003b) or Riedel (2009), Section 4.1.
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Lemma 2. The payoffs (Xn)n≤N satisfy
Xn =Yn ·min
P∈P
P [Yn+1 = 0, . . . , YN = 0] (2.5)
=Yn ·
N∏
k=n+1
(1− bk)
=:Yn ·Bn
The agent faces now a sequence of adapted payoffs where for each n ≤ N
the payoff Zn is monotone in Yn (indeed, linear). The random variables
(Yn)n≤N are independent under the measure Q where the conditional proba-
bilities for a candidate are
Q[Yn = 1|Y1, . . . , Yn−1] = an . (2.6)
Moreover, the probabilities of finding a candidate are smallest under this
measure in the whole class P in the sense of first–order stochastic dominance.
We are thus in a situation that is called a monotone problem in Riedel (2009).
The general theory there tells us that the optimal stopping rule with multiple
priors coincides with the optimal stopping rule under the measure Q – the
worst-case measure.
Theorem 1. The optimal stopping rule τ ∗ for 2.4 is the same as the optimal
stopping rule for the Bayesian problem
maximize EQ[Xτ ]. (2.7)
over all stopping times τ ≤ N where Q is as defined in 2.6.
Optimal Stopping under the Worst–Case Measure Q
We are now back to a classical optimal stopping problem under the measure
Q. A standard argument shows that optimal stopping rules must be simple.
It works as follows. From classical optimal stopping we know that it is
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optimal to stop when the current payoff Xn is equal to the current value of
the problem
vn := sup
τ≥n
EQ [Xτ |X1, . . . , Xn] .
The independence of the X1, . . . , XN under Q implies that the value of the
problem after having rejected n − 1 applicants is independent of the past
observations, i.e.
vn = sup
τ≥n
EQ[Xτ ]. (2.8)
The sequence (vn)n≤N is decreasing as we maximize over a smaller set of
stopping times. On the other hand, the sequence (Bn)n≤N defined as
Bn :=
N∏
k=n+1
(1− bk)
is increasing in n. Now suppose that it is optimal to take a candidate n. We
have then Bn = vn; therefore, we get
Bn+1 ≥ Bn = vn ≥ vn+1 ,
and it is also optimal to stop when a candidate appears at time n + 1. We
conclude that optimal stopping rules are simple.
Lemma 3. The optimal stopping rule τ ∗ is simple, i.e. there exists a number
1 ≤ r∗ ≤ N , s.t.
τ ∗ = τ(r∗) = inf{n ≥ r∗|Yn = 1}.
In the next step we compute the optimal threshold r∗ maximizing (2.8)
over all simple strategies. Let us denote by
φ(r) := EQ[Xτ(r)]
the payoff from starting to search at applicant r. We then have
φ(N) := EQ(Xτ(N)) = aN (2.9)
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and
φ(r) = ar ·Br + (1− ar) · φ(r + 1) (2.10)
for r < N .
While our recursive formula for φ(r) is useful for numerical computations,
we record also the explicit solution of this linear difference equation. To
simplify the interpretation of this expression, we introduce two concepts.
Definition 1. For each n ≤ N we call
αn =
1− an
1− bn = 1 +
bn − an
1− bn
the degree of ambiguity and
βn =
an
1− bn
the ambiguous odds of applicant n.
The first ratio αn measures the relative ambiguity persisting at the time
n. The term tends to 1 as the size of the interval [an, bn] decreases. In case
of an = bn the node n is completely unambiguous and the decision maker
faces only risk at n. Similarly, one can think of the product
∏N
k=n αk as the
cumulated ambiguity persisting between n andN . The model is unambiguous
if and only if
∏N
k=1 αk = 1. Note, that we call the ratio p/(1−p) the odds for
a zero–one bet. In a similar way, the ration βn measures the odds of seeing
a candidate at time n where we now use the (nonlinear) probability induced
by our ambiguity model.
The solution of the linear difference equation 2.10 with boundary condi-
tion 2.9 is given by
φ(r) =Br−1
(
βn + αnβn+1 + · · ·
n−1∏
k=r
αkβN
)
(2.11)
=Br−1 ·
(
N∑
n=r
βn
n−1∏
k=r
αl
)
.
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Let us check now that φ has a unique maximizer. From our recursion
2.10, we get that φ(r)− φ(r + 1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to wr ≤ 1 for
wr :=
φ(r + 1)
Br
=
N∑
n=r
βn
n−1∏
k=r
αk . (2.12)
As αk > 1 and βn > 0, the sequence (wr)r≤N is strictly decreasing. Thus,
(φ(r))r≤N is increasing as long as wr > 1 and decreasing afterwards, which
shows that it has a unique maximum.
The maximizer is determined by
r∗ = inf{r ≥ 1|wr ≤ 1} (2.13)
The optimal threshold r∗ is determined by the weighted average of ambiguous
odds weighted with the ambiguity persisting between r and N . Equation
(2.12) and Equation (2.13) completely characterize the solution.
We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. 1. The optimal stopping rule for 2.3 is simple, i.e. the agent
first observes r∗ candidates and takes then the first candidate that ap-
pears;
2. The optimal threshold r∗ for the cutoff is given via (2.12) and (2.13).
2.3 Comparative Statics
In this section we use the sequence (wr)r≤N and the variables (αn)r≤N and
(βn)r≤N defined above to analyze the effects of ambiguity on stopping and
the structure of the stopping strategy τ ∗.
As it was shown in Riedel (2009), an ambiguity averse decision maker behaves
like a Bayesian decision maker under a special worst-case probability measure
constructed via backward induction. We have seen in the preceding section
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how to construct this measure, and that the optimal stopping rule is still
simple. The central question by analyzing the effect of ambiguity is now the
threshold r∗. In case of monotone problems where the payoff is known at the
time of decision such as House Selling Problem or Parking Problem discussed
in Riedel (2009) ambiguity leads to earlier stopping. The use of the worst-
case measure lowers the value of the Snell envelope and forces the agent to
stop earlier. The situation differs here because the agent faces actually two
kinds of uncertainty. On the one hand, there is payoff uncertainty in the
adapted version of the problem because the probability distribution of Yn
is not known. This effect leads to earlier stopping because it reduces the
expected value from waiting. On the other hand, ambiguity also affects the
chances that a better applicant is going to come after the current candidate.
This ambiguity induces the agent to wait longer because she believes after
stopping that candidates are going to appear with high probability. The two
effects work against each other, and we thus proceed to study more detailed
models in which we can disentangle them14. In addition, we compute the
value of the threshold r∗ and show that asymptotically, the relative fraction
of applicants that the agent lets go by can assume any value between 0 and
1.
2.3.1 Ambiguous Secretary Problem
Our first example is the multiple prior version of the classical secretary prob-
lem. The decision maker is uncertain about the real distribution of the order-
ings for reasons explained in the introduction but has no additional informa-
tion on the quality of the applicants. Doubting her strategy she aims to know
what happens if she changes the measure slightly. Instead of P [Yn = 1] =
1
n
,
the ambiguity averse decision maker assumes that the probability lies in an
14A similar point has been made in a completely different model in Nishimura and Ozaki
(2007) when there is uncertainty about the timing and uncertainty about the value from
stopping.
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N / γ 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
5 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5
10 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 7 10
50 19 19 19 20 20 22 24 27 34
100 38 38 38 38 39 43 46 53 65
500 185 185 186 189 193 210 227 257 316
1000 369 369 372 376 385 419 453 513 630
Table 2.1: Absolute values of the threshold r∗ for different values of N and
levels of ambiguity γ. The threshold is increasing with ambiguity. The agent
waits longer before accepting a candidate when ambiguity increases.
interval near by 1
n
, i.e.
P [Yn = 1|Fn−1] ∈
[
γ
n
,
1
γn
]
for appropriately chosen γ < 115, 2 ≤ n ≤ N . The parameter γ measures the
level of uncertainty, as it tends to 1 the uncertainty about the probability
of finding a candidates vanishes. In the limit, for γ = 1 we are back in the
classical case.
We can use the analysis of the preceding section to compute the thresholds
r∗ that depends on γ and N , of course. Typical values are tabulated in Table
2.1 and 2.2 for the absolute and relative values of the threshold, resp. It is
interesting to see that one waits longer as ambiguity increases. The effect of
missing a potentially better applicant outweighs the lower expectation from
ambiguity. We get here a potentially testable implication: the more uncertain
the agent is, the longer she should wait before taking a decisive action in a
best choice problem.
The following result gives exact boundaries for the optimal threshold de-
pending upon γ and N .
15Of course one has to choose γ in a way that ensures that P [Yn = 1|Fn−1] ∈ (0, 1) for
all 2 ≤ n ≤ N .
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N / γ 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
5 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 100% 100% 100%
10 40% 40% 50% 50% 50% 50% 60% 70% 100%
50 38% 38% 38% 40% 40% 44% 48% 54% 68%
100 38% 38% 38% 38% 39% 43% 46% 53% 65%
500 37% 37% 37% 38% 39% 42% 45% 51% 63%
1000 37% 37% 37% 38% 39% 42% 45% 51% 63%
Table 2.2: Relative values of the threshold r∗ for different values of N and
levels of ambiguity γ. Also the relative threshold is increasing with ambiguity.
Theorem 3. For given γ > 1
2
and N , the optimal threshold r∗(γ,N) satisfies
e−
1
γ ≤ r
∗(γ,N)
N
≤ e− 2γ1+γ + 3
N
. (2.14)
In particular, the secretary problem is robust in the sense that
lim
N→∞,γ↑1
r∗(γ,N)
N
= lim
N→∞
r∗(0)
N
= e−1 . (2.15)
2.3.2 Independent Coins with Identical Ambiguity
Our example corresponds to the independent indistinguishably distributed
case introduced in Epstein and Schneider (2003a). Here, the probability to
meet a candidate remains constant over time. More generally, this is the
case, where the decision maker does not know if the experiment changes over
time. At the same time she has no reason to distinguish between periods.
To express the uncertainty about the coin the agent uses a class of measures
in each period.
We consider the following bet: We observe an ambiguous coin being tossed
N times and we win if we stop at the last time {head} appears in the sequence.
With this setup we are in the situation of the ambiguous best choice problem
where the probabilities for {head} remain constant over time:
P [n-th toss is a head|Fn−1] ∈ [p− , p+ ]
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for  ≥ 0, chosen such that 0 < p −  < p +  < 1. To get a feeling for the
problem, let us start with the pure risk case,  = 0. In this case, we get
wr = β(N − r) = p
1− p(N − r)
and the optimal threshold is the first r such that
N − r ≤ 1− p
p
.
In this problem, it is optimal to focus solely on the last
[
1−p
p
]
+ 1 applicants,
irrespective of the total number of applicants.
Let us now come to the ambiguous case. From Equation 2.12, we obtain
for the degree of ambiguity α = 1−p+
1−p− > 1 and ambiguous odds β =
p−
1−p−
wr =
N∑
k=r
β
k−1∏
l=r
α = β
αN−r+1 − 1
α− 1 .
The threshold r∗ is given by the first r such that
αN−r ≤ 1 + α− 1
β
=
p+ 
p−  .
We learn from this that the agent focuses only on the last
k(p, ) ' log
p+
p−
log 1−p+
1−p−
applicants. This quantity is independent of N .
In this case we observe memoryless stopping : The decision about stopping
does not depend on the number of the options already observed. Only the
number of options left matters. Consequently, we obtain
lim
N→∞
r∗(N)
N
= 1 .
This example also allows us to demonstrate that ambiguity can lead both
to earlier as well as to later stopping. For p < 1
2
, the quantity k(p, ) is
increasing; consequently, the agent stops earlier when ambiguity increases.
For p = 1/2, k(p, ) is independent of  and ambiguity does not influence the
stopping behavior. For p > 1/2, the agent stops later, in general.
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2.3.3 Finite Stopping
In our last example we consider the case where the probability to meet a
candidate falls very fast. Here, the value of waiting decreases very fast and
becomes zero at some point. In this situation the future becomes worthless
and interviewing additional candidates does not improve the expected payoff.
Even if the pool of applicants is infinite the decision will be made in finite
time. Here, we can compute the maximal amount of applicants that need to
be interviewed in order to decide optimally.
To see how it works we first consider the value of waiting for a fixed
number of candidates N and a given one-step-ahead probabilities [an, bn].
Now we add an applicant with P [YN+1 = 1|FN ] ∈ [aN+1, bN+1]. Clearly,
adding applicants does not decrease the value of the problem. As we vary
the number of applicants now, let us write wNr for the crucial sequence that
determines the threshold r∗(N). Clearly, wNr is increasing in N and the value
of the threshold r∗(N + 1) ≥ r∗(N). Now assume that w∞r := limN→∞wNr
exists. Then we can find R ∈ N s.t. w∞R < 1 and therefore wNR < 1 for all N
sufficiently large. Therefore, the value of the threshold r∗(N) cannot exceed
R. As r∗(N) is an increasing, but bounded sequence of integers, it has to be
constant from some point on, r∗(N) = R for N sufficiently large.
In other words, the number of applicants does not matter here for large
pools of applicants. The agent first studies a fixed number of applicants
before taking the next candidate.
Lemma 4. If
w∞ := lim
N→∞
wN1 (2.16)
exists, then
1. The value of the threshold r∗(N) is bounded by a constant R ∈ N and
for sufficiently large N ∈ N, we have r∗(N) = R,
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2. The fraction of rejected candidates converges to zero, i.e.
lim
N→∞
r∗(N)
N
= 0 .
Let us reflect a moment under what condition the series w∞ =
∑∞
k=1 βk
∏k−1
l=r αl
is finite. By d’Alembert’s ratio test, this is the case if we have
lim sup
n→∞
1− an
an
an+1
1− bn+1 < 1 .
This condition holds true, e.g., when both (an) and (bn) converge fast, say
exponentially, to zero.
In this section we analyzed the observation period for different sets of
measures. Depending on the structure of the set P the observation period
converges to a constant c ∈ (0, 1) as in the case of the ambiguous secre-
tary problem. Or it can converge to zero making the future worthless as in
the finite stopping case. In the opposite case of memoryless stopping the
observation period tends to 1, assigning zero value to the past.
2.4 Conclusion
We provide a closed form solution for the best choice problem in the multiple
prior framework. An appropriate version of backward induction leads to the
solution if the set of priors is time-consistent. Due to time-consistency most of
classical arguments remain valid, the stopping rule is simple. The closed form
solution allows to analyze the impact of ambiguity on the stopping behavior.
Additionally, we show the robustness of the classical secretary problem in
the multiple prior framework. A natural next step is to generalize the utility
function. Additionally, one might extend the model to infinite settings.
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Chapter 3
Exercise Strategies for
American Exotic Options under
Ambiguity
3.1 Introduction
The increasing trade volume of exotic options both in the plain form and
as component of more sophisticated products motivates the more precise
study of these structures. The OTC nature of these contracts allows for
almost endless variety of products which comes at the price of tractability
and evaluation complexity. The payoff of the option is often conditioned on
an event during the lifetime leading to a path dependent structure which is
challenging to evaluate.
Most of the literature on this field concentrates on hedging or replication
analyzing the hedging strategy of the seller or deriving the no arbitrage price.
This analysis is sufficient in the case of European options as it also captures
the problem of the buyer. However, in the case of American options the
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task of the buyer holding the option in her portfolio differs structurally from
the hedging problem of the seller. Unlike the bank/the market the holder
of the option is not interested in the risk neutral value of the option but
aims to exercise the claim optimally realizing highest possible utility. This
valuation in general needs not to be related to the market value of the option
as it reflects the personal utility of the holder which depends on investment
horizon and objectives and also on the risk attitude of the holder.
Given a stochastic model in discrete time, such as the Cox, Ross, and
Rubinstein (1979) (CRR) model one can easily solve the problem of the
buyer using dynamic programming. However, classical binomial tree models
impose the assumption of a unique given probability measure driving the
stock price process. This assumption might be too strong in several cases
as it requires perfect understanding of the market structure and complete
agreement on one particular model.
As an example we consider an asset manager holding an American claim in
her portfolio. Her exercise decision depends on the underlying model for the
stock price process derived from filtering using past stock price observations.
As the model cannot be determined perfectly she faces model uncertainty.
Being unable to completely specify the model the asset manager rather uses
multiple prior model instead of choosing one particular model. If the uncer-
tainty cannot be resolved and the accurate model specification is impossible
more robust strategies are to be preferred as they perform well even if the
model is specified slightly incorrect.1
Also a risk controlling unit assigning value and riskiness to the portfo-
lio chosen by the manager uses rather a multiple prior models in order to
test for model robustness and to measure model risk. Taking several mod-
els into account while performing portfolio distress tests allows to check for
1Several authors discussed the robust portfolio optimization problem in the multiple
prior context. However, most of works on this field only consider investments in plain
vanilla products.
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the sensitivity of the portfolio to model misspecification. Again in a situa-
tion of model uncertainty more robust riskiness assignment is desirable as it
minimizes model risk/uncertainty2.
Similar reasoning can be applied to accounting issues. An investment
funds manager making his annual valuation is interested in the value of op-
tions in the book that are not settled yet. In case the company applies
coherent risk measures as standard risk evaluation tool for future cash flows
on the short side, it is plausible to use a multiple prior model evaluating
long positions. Finally, a private investor holding American claims in his
account might exhibit ambiguity aversion in the sense of Ellsberg paradox
or Knightian uncertainty. Such behavior may arise from lack of expertise or
bad quality of information that is available to the decision maker.
Although for different reasons, all the market participants described above
face problems that should not be analyzed in a single prior model and can be
formulated as multiple prior problems. In this paper we analyze the problem
of the holder of an American claim facing model uncertainty that results in
a multiple prior model. We characterize optimal stopping strategies for the
buyer that assesses utility to future payoffs in terms of minimal expectation
and study how the multiple prior structure affects the stopping behavior.
Multiple prior models have gained much attention in recent studies. Hansen
and Sargent (2001) considered the multiple prior models in the context of ro-
bust control, Karatzas and Zamfirescu (2003) approached the problem from
game theoretical point of view. Delbaen (2002) introduced the notion of
coherent risk measures which mathematically corresponds to the approach
used in this paper.
The decision theoretical model of multiple priors was introduced by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and further developed to dynamical settings by Ep-
stein and Schneider (2003b). The methods we use in this paper rely heavily
2See Cont (2006) for an extensive discussion on the issue of model risk
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on these works.
Epstein and Schneider (2003a) applied the multiple prior model to financial
markets and Epstein and Schneider (2003b) addressed the question of learn-
ing under uncertainty. Riedel (2009) considered the general task to optimally
stop an adapted payoff process in a multiple prior model and showed that
backward induction fails in general. He imposed more structure on the set
of priors that ensured that the solution can be found using an appropriate
form of backward induction. The cornerstone of the method is the time-
consistency of the set of priors which allows the decision maker to change her
beliefs about the underlying model as the time evolves. If the set of priors is
time-consistent one can proceed as in the classical case3 computing the value
process of the stopping problem – the multiple prior Snell envelope. It is
then optimal to stop as soon as the payoff process reaches the value process.
Additionally, the ambiguous optimal stopping problem corresponds to a clas-
sical optimal stopping problem for a measure Pˆ – the so-called worst-case
measure4.
As an application of the technique Riedel (2009) solves the exercise prob-
lem for the buyer of an American put and call in discrete time. A similar
problem was analyzed by Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and later by Kort and
Trojanowska (2007), they considered the optimal investment decision for a
firm in continuous time with infinite time horizon under multiple priors which
can be related to the perpetual American call. In this paper we follow the
lines of Riedel (2009) and analyze several exotic options that have a second
source of uncertainty from the perspective of the buyer in a multiple prior
setting. We focus on the discrete time version of the problem and develop an
ambiguous version of the CRR model. Instead of assuming that the distribu-
tion of up- and down- movements of the underlying is known to the buyer we
allow the probability of going up on a node to lie in a appropriately modeled
3See Snell (1952),Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund (1971) for more detailed analysis.
4See Riedel (2009), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), Karatzas and Kou (1998).
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set5.
This leads to a set of models that agree on the size of up- and down-
movement but disagree on the mean return. In this ambiguous binomial
tree setting which was first analyzed in Epstein and Schneider (2003a) we
aim to apply standard Snell reasoning to evaluate the options. Due to the
above mentioned duality result it is enough to calculate the worst-case mea-
sure Pˆ and then to analyze the classical problem under Pˆ . However, the
worst-case measure depends highly on the payoff structure of the claim and
needs to be calculated for each option separately. If the payoff satisfies cer-
tain monotonicity conditions the worst-case measure is easy to derive. The
direction/effect of uncertainty is the same for all states of the world and the
worst-case measure is then independent on the realization of the stock price
process leading to a statical structure that resembles classical models. In the
case of more sophisticated payoffs this stationarity of the worst-case measure
breaks down and the worst-case measure changes over time depending on the
realization of the stock price process. This is due to the fact that uncertainty
may affect the model in different ways changing the beliefs of decision maker
and so the worst-case measure according to the effect that is dominating.
This ability to react to information by adjusting the model and to choose the
model depending on the payoff is the main structural difference between the
classical single measure model and the multiple prior model considered here.
We identify additional sources of uncertainty that lead to the dynamical
and path-dependent structure of the worst-case measure. We also analyze
the impact of different effects of uncertainty on the overall behavior and the
resulting model highlighting differences between the single prior models used
in the literature and the multiple prior model introduced here.
In our analysis we decompose the claims in monotone parts as the worst-
case measure for monotone problems is well known. We then analyze each
5Alternatively one might assume that the probability of an up-movement is known
while the size of the increment is not. This approach turns out to be equivalent to ours.
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claim separately deriving the worst-case measure conditioned on monotonic-
ity. To complete the analysis we paste the measures obtained on subspaces
together using time-consistency. This idea is closely linked to the method of
pricing derivatives using digital contracts introduced by Ingersoll (2007) and
also used by Buchen (2004). However, this literature focuses on European
style options and does not cover the dynamical structure analyzed here.
In the case of barrier options the value of the option is conditioned on the
event of reaching a trigger. Unlike the plain vanilla option case, the lifetime
of an barrier option become uncertain as it depends on the occurrence of the
trigger event. This leads to an additional source of uncertainty causing a
change in the monotonicity of the value function when the stock price hits
the barrier. For example, in the case of an up-and-in put the ambiguity
averse decision maker assumes the returns to be low and chooses therefore
the measure with the lowest drift before the stock price reaches the barrier.
After hitting the barrier she obtains a plain vanilla put option monotone in
the underlying and uses therefore the measure with the highest drift. Similar
behavior can be observed for other types of barrier options.
The second group of options we focus on are the dual expiry options. Here,
the strike of the option is not known at time zero as it is being determined as
a function of the underlying’s value on a date different from the issue date of
the option – the first expiry. Therefore, additional to the uncertainty about
the final payoff the decision maker faces uncertainty about the value of the
strike before first expiry date.
In the case of shout options the first expiration date, the so-called shout
date/freeze date, is determined by the buyer. Here, the investor has to call the
bank if she aims to fix the strike. Therefore, the buyer of an shout option faces
two stopping problems: First, she has to determine the optimal shouting time
in order to set the strike optimally and then the to stop the payoff process
optimally. The holder of an shout put gets an put after shouting and thus,
anticipates high returns on the stock after shouting. Before shouting however
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he owns a claims whose value is increasing in the price of the underlying which
results in low returns anticipated before shouting.
Finally, we analyze options whose payoff function consists of two mono-
tone pieces. Typical examples are straddles and strangles. The buyer of such
options presumes a change in the underlying’s price but is not sure about
the direction of the change. Depending on the value of the underlying the
option pays off a call or a put, so as a consequence the actual payoff function
becomes uncertain. Here, one can decompose the value of the option in an
increasing and a decreasing leg. The buyer of the option changes her beliefs
about the returns every time the value switches from decreasing to increas-
ing part of the value function. So, an ambiguity averse buyer of a straddle
presumes the stock price to go down in hausse phases and up in baisse phases.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the discrete
model which is in this form due to Riedel (2009). Section 3 recalls the solution
for payoffs monotone in underlying’s price introduced in Riedel (2009) and
builds the base for the following analysis. Section 4 provides the solution
for barrier options options, and Section 5 develops the solution for multiple
expiry. Finally, Section 6 discusses U–shaped payoffs.
3.2 Financial Markets and Optimal Stopping
under Ambiguity in discrete Time
We first introduce the basic theoretical setup to evaluate options in multiple
prior model. This model has the CRR model as the starting point and was
already developed in Riedel (2009) and can be seen as a version of the IID
model introduced in Epstein and Schneider (2003a) with a different objective.
At the same time the model is the discrete time version of the κ–ambiguity
model in Epstein and Chen (2002).
Having established the model we discuss the market structure and recall
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the decision problem of the buyer and the solution method – the multiple
prior backward induction introduced by Riedel (2009).
3.2.1 Stochastic Structure
To set up the model we start with a classical binomial tree. For a fixed matu-
rity date T ∈ N we consider a probability space (Ω,F , P0) where Ω = ⊗Tt=1S
with S = {0, 1} is the the set of all sequences with values in {0, 1}, F is the
σ–field generated by all projections t : Ω → S and P0 denotes the uniform
on (Ω,F). By construction, the projections (t)t=1,...,T are independent and
identically distributed under P0 with P0(t = 1) =
1
2
for all t ≤ T . Fur-
thermore, we consider the filtration (Ft)t=0,...,T generated by the projections
(t)t=1,...,T where F0 is the trivial σ–field – {∅,Ω}. The event t = 1 repre-
sents an up-movement on a tree while the complementary event denotes the
down-movement6.
Additionally, we define a convex set of measures Q in the following way:
We fix an interval [p, p] ⊂ (0, 1) for p ≤ p and consider all measures whose
conditional one–step–ahead probabilities, i.e. the conditional probability of
going up on a node of the tree remain within the interval [p, p] for every
t ≤ T , i.e.
Q = {P ∈M1(Ω)|P (t = 1|Ft−1) ∈ [p, p], ∀t ≤ T} (3.1)
The set Q is generated by the conditional one-step-ahead correspondence
assigning at every node t ≤ T the probability of going up. In particular,
Q contains all product measures defined via Pp(t+1 = 1|Ft) = p for a fixed
p ∈ [p, p] and all t < T . In the following we denote by P = Pp and by P = Pp.
Clearly, the state variables (t)t=1,...,T are independent under all product
measures, correlated in general, however. To see this consider the measure
6We assume FT+1 := FT and inf ∅ :=∞.
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P τ defined via
P τ (t+1 = 1|Ft) =
{
p if t ≤ τ
p else
for a stopping time τ ≤ T . As the one-step-ahead probabilities remain in the
interval [p, p] the so defined measure P τ belongs to Q for all stopping times
τ ≤ T . At the same time the probability of going up on a node depends on
the realized path through the value of τ and (t)t=1,...,T are correlated.
The above example reveals an important structural feature of Q: The set
of measures is stable under the operation of decomposition in marginal and
conditional part. Loosely speaking, it allows the decision maker to change
the measure she uses as the time evolves in an appropriate manner. In the
example above, the decision maker first uses the measure P until an event
indicated by the stopping time τ and then changes to P . Mathematically,
this property is equivalent to an appropriate version of the Law of Iterated
Expectation and is closely linked to the idea of backward induction. The con-
cept has gained much attention in the recent literature and was also discussed
under different notions by Delbaen (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2003a),
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) and Riedel (2009).
The following lemma summarizes crucial properties of the set Q.
Lemma 5. The set of measures defined as in (3.1) satisfies the following
properties
1. Q is compact and convex,
2. all P ∈ Q are equivalent to P0,
3. Q is time-consistent in the following sense: Let P,Q ∈ Q, (pt)t, (qt)t
densities of P,Q with respect to P0. For a fixed stopping time τ define
the measure R via
rt =
{
pt if t ≤ τ
pτ qt
qτ
else
then R ∈ Q.
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Due to Lemma 5 we can identify the set Q with the set of the density
processes with respect to the measure P0. In the following we denote by D
the density process of P ∈ Q with respect to P0, i.e. Dt = dPdP0 |Ft for P ∈ Q,
t ≤ T . A more detailed analysis of the structure of D can be found in Riedel
(2009).
3.2.2 The Market Model
Within the above introduced probabilistic framework we establish the finan-
cial market in the spirit of the CRR model. We consider a market consist-
ing of two assets: a riskless bond with a fixed interest rate r > −1 and
a risky stock with multiplicative increments. For given model parameters
0 < d < 1 + r < u and S0 > 0 the stock S evolves according to
St+1 = St ·
{
u if t+1 = 1
d if t+1 = 0
.
Without loss of generality, we assume u · d = 17.Then, for every t ≤ T the
range of possible stock prices is finite and bounded, we denote by
Et = {S0 · ut−2k|k ∈ N,−t ≤ k ≤ t}
the set of possible stock prices at time t. Moreover, the filtration generated by
the sequence (St)t=0,...,T coincides with (Ft)t=0,1,...,T and every realized path
(s1, . . . , st) of S can be associated with a realization of (s)s≤t.
As the state variables are not independent under every probability mea-
sure P ∈ Q in our model the increments of S are correlated in general. The
probability of an up-movement depends on the realized path but stays within
the boundaries [p, p] for every P ∈ Q.
Economically, our model describes a market where the market partici-
pants are not perfectly certain about the asset price dynamics. In order to
7This is a common assumption when dealing with exotic options in binomial models,
see Cox and Rubinstein (1985) for a detailed discussion.
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express this uncertainty investors use a class of measures constructed above.
The set Q is the set of possible models the decision maker takes into ac-
count. Different choices of P ∈ Q correspond to different models. With our
specification mean return on stock is uncertain and as one can easily see, P
corresponds to the highest mean return at every node, while P corresponds
to the lowest mean return on stock on every node. The specification of Q
is a part of the model and in practice may arise from regulation policies or
be imposed by the bank accounting standards, result from statistical con-
sideration or just reflects the degree of ambiguity aversion. The length of
the interval [p, p] determines the range of possible models. As the interval
decreases the model converges to the classical binomial tree model and we
obtain the classical CRR model as a special case of our model by choosing
p = p.
The use of a set of models especially allows for correlated returns. This
gives the decision maker the possibility to adjust the models as the path
is realized and new information arrives. Now the economical implication of
time-consistency of Q becomes clear. Due to this property the multiple prior
decision maker is allowed to use the measure P1 ∈ Q until an event indicated
by a stopping time τ and then to change his beliefs about the right model
using P2 after τ . The multiple prior decision maker is allowed to adjust the
model she uses responding to the state of the market. However, this notion
is not the same as classical Bayesian learning as the decision maker has too
little information or market knowledge to learn the real distribution. While
in the learning process the decision maker updates the model adjusting the
set of possible models, here the investor keeps the set of possible models
fixed not excluding any of the possible models as the time evolves but choses
a particular model at every point of the time reconsidering her choice when
new information arrives.
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3.2.3 The Decision Problem
In this setting we consider an investor holding an exotic option in her port-
folio. As most of the exotic options are OTC8 contracts there is usually
no functioning market for these derivatives or the trading of claims involves
high transaction costs. Therefore, in absence of a trading partner the buyer
is forced to hold the claim until maturity, so we exclude the possibility of sell-
ing the acquired contracts concentrating purely on the exercise decision of
the investor. In our analysis we mainly concentrate on institutional investors
already holding the derivatives in the portfolio. Therefore, it is plausible to
assume risk neutral agents who discount future payoff by the riskless rate.
Remark 1. When having an ambiguity averse private investor in mind it
seems natural also to introduce risk aversion and to discount by individual
discount rate δ. As these considerations do not change the structure of the
worst-case measure obtained here, we omit this possibility maintaining risk
neutrality.
We consider an American claim A : Ω → R+ written on the asset S
and maturing at T that pays off A(t, (Ss)s≤t) when exercised at time t. The
investor holding A in her portfolio aims to maximize her expected payoff
by choosing an appropriate exercise strategy, i.e. the best time to exercise
the contract. As the expectation in our multiple prior setting is not uniquely
defined the ambiguity averse decision maker maximizes her minimal expected
payoff, i.e.
maximize inf
P∈Q
EPA(τ, (Ss)s≤τ ) over all stopping times τ ≤ T. (3.2)
The choice of the exercise strategy according to the worst possible model
corresponds to conservative value assignment. It treats long book positions
8OTC deals are contracts that are traded over the counter with a counterparty and
not through a centralized liquid trade exchange.
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in the same way as the coherent risk measures treats short positions9. The
value of the multiple prior problem UQ stated in (3.2) is lower or equal than
the value of the problem UP for every possible model P ∈ Q. Therefore,
this notion minimizes the model risk as the model misspecification within Q
increases the value of the claim.
Remark 2. 1. The problem of the long investor stated in (3.2) differs
structurally from the task of the seller of the option. The seller of
the American claim needs to hedge claim against every strategy of the
buyer. To obtain the hedge she solves the optimal stopping problem
under the equivalent martingale measure P ∗. In the binomial tree the
unique equivalent martingale measure P ∗ is completely determined by
parameters r, u and d and does not depend on the mean return. See
Hull (2006) for a more detailed analysis. The situation is different for
the buyer as she solves the optimal stopping problem under the physical
measure taking the mean return into account and being interested in
personal utility maximization rather than in risk neutral valuation. Al-
though the buyer and the seller use different techniques assigning value
to the options and obtaining different values for the claim there is no
contradiction to no arbitrage condition because of the American struc-
ture of the claims considered here.
2. It is usual to evaluate claims in the book that are not settled yet using
mark-to-market approach. The value of the option is then set to be
equal to the market price. This makes sense if markets are well func-
tioning or if the investor intends to sell the option on the secondary
market rather than hold it until maturity. However, this approach may
value the claims wrongly in times of distressed markets or if there is no
market for the security at all as it was seen and still is seen at financial
markets these days. Multiple prior value assignment through UQ is an
9Mathematically, our model is equivalent to a representation of coherent risk measures.
See Delbaen (2002) or Riedel (2009) for more detailed analysis.
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alternative to the mark-to-market accounting as it provides conservative
value assignment by using the worst possible scenario but protects the
book value from too pessimistic or overoptimistic views of the market
that are due to expectations and do not reflect fundamentals. However,
UQ is not the price for the option but rather the private value for the
investor that may differ from the market view.
3.2.4 The Solution Method
If Q is a singleton the problem stated in (3.2) can be solved using classical
dynamic programing methods. One defines backwards the value process of
the problem – the Snell envelope – and stops as soon as the value process
reaches the payoff process. This technique fails to hold in the multiple prior
setting10. Riedel (2009) extended backward induction to the case of time-
consistent multiple priors stating sufficient conditions for the Snell arguments
to hold.
Theorem 4 (Riedel (2009)). Given a set of measures satisfying conditions
stated in Lemma 5 and a payoff process X = (Xt)t=0,...,T bounded by a Q-
uniformly integrable variable Z, define the multiple prior Snell envelope UQ
recursively by
UQT =XT (3.3)
UQt = max{Xt, inf
P∈Q
EP (UQt+1|Ft)} for t < T
Then,
1. UQ is the smallest multiple prior Q-supermartingale 11 dominating the
payoff process X.
10See Riedel (2009) for an example.
11Given a set of measures Q, a multiple prior supermartingale with respect to Q is an
adapted process, say S, satisfying St ≥ ess infP∈Q EP (St+1|Ft) for t ∈ N.
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2. UQ is the value process of the multiple prior stopping problem for the
payoff process X, i.e.
UQt = sup
τ≥t
inf
P∈Q
EP (Xτ |Ft)
3. An optimal stopping rule is then given by
τQ = inf{t ≥ 0|UQt = Xt}.
The above result ensures the existence of the solution of problem (3.2).
Moreover, as shown by several authors (for example Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004), Karatzas and Kou (1998), Riedel (2009)) problem (3.2) is equiva-
lent to a single prior problem for a measure Pˆ ∈ Q, i.e. the value function
of the multiple prior problem
UQ = U Pˆ P0-a.s.. (3.4)
The measure Pˆ is called worst–case measure and can be constructed via
backward induction by choosing the worst one-step-ahead probability at ev-
ery node of the tree and pasting the so obtained densities together at time 0.
The worst-case measure is stochastic in general and depends on the payoff
process.
Due to equality (3.4) the optimal stopping strategies τQ of the multiple
prior problem and τ Pˆ of the problem for the prior Pˆ coincide. Therefore,
the problem can be solved in two steps. In the first step one identifies the
worst–case measure Pˆ and solves the classical problem under Pˆ in the second
step. This technique allows to make use of solutions already obtained in
the classical case. For problems where no closed form solution is available
the technique reduces numerical complexity by reducing the task to a single
model problem where methods are well developed.
Analyzing the exotic options we use this techniques emphasizing the be-
havioral interpretation of the worst–case measure and highlighting the dif-
ference between classical models and the multiple prior approach.
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3.2.5 Options with Monotone Payoffs
In this subsection we provide the solution for claims whose payoffs are mono-
tone in the underlying’s price at each time and satisfy the Markov property.
The results of this section build the foundation for the analysis of more com-
plicated payoffs in the next sections and were stated in Riedel (2009).
We consider a discounted American claim maturing at T and paying off
Xt = A(t, St) when exercised at t.
Theorem 5 (Riedel (2009)). 1. If the payoff function of the claim A(t, St)
is increasing in St for all t, then the multiple prior Snell envelope is
UQ = UP
where P is the measure defined by the density
Dt = 2
t
∏
u≤t
pu + (1− p)(1− u)
and the holder of the claim uses the optimal stopping rule given by
τP = inf{t ≥ 0 : A(t, St) = UPt }.
2. If A(t, St) is decreasing in St for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is
UQ = UP
where P is the measure defined by the density
Dt = 2
t
∏
u≤t
pu + (1− p)(1− u)
and an optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : A(t, St) = UPt }.
The key to this result is the fact that P (or P resp.) is the worst proba-
bility measure in the sense of first–order stochastic dominance and that the
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payoff is a monotone function of the underlying stock price. These results
help us finding the worst-case measure for more complicated payoffs. Using
appropriate decompositions we represent the options as monotone claims. For
those monotone claims we can identify the worst-case measure using Theo-
rem 5. Pasting the so obtained measures together we construct the desired
worst-case measure.
3.3 Barrier Options
Barrier options are among most traded exotic options and are often used as
components of more sophisticated structured derivatives. The payoff of a
barrier claim depends on the stock price reaching the barrier prespecified in
the contract: in options are activated when the stock price hits the barrier
while out options become worthless at the barrier. Depending on the direc-
tion of the stock price change one distinguishes between up and down options
indicating whether the stock price reaches the barrier from below or above.
Combining barrier features yields four different barrier types each of which
helps expressing different views on the market. Once activated an in-barrier
option is then a plain vanilla call or put with known payoff structure12.
The knock-in/knock-out feature of the options lowers the price which has
to be paid by the buyer. In return, the buyer is exposed to the risk of the
barrier event that makes the option worthless. This singularity of the payoff
at the barrier makes the barrier option interesting from the mathematical
point of view and challenging to evaluate.
Unlike plain vanilla options discussed in the previous section barrier op-
tions are path-dependent as the payoff depends on the stock process reaching
the barrier. Thus, the Markovian reasoning that was essential for the results
cannot be applied directly. However, conditioned on the event of reaching the
12Combining put and call payoffs with the four different barrier types introduced above
gives eight different barrier options.
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barrier, the option is Markovian again. Also the second important ingredient
for the above result – the monotonicity of the payoff at every node fails to
hold here in general. To overcome this difficulty we extend the Theorem 2
to hold not for all t ≤ T but on stochastic intervals.
To formalize the ideas stated above mathematically we denote by
τuH : Ω −→ [0, T + 1], τuH(ω) := inf {t ≥ 0 : St(ω) ≥ H} ∧ T + 1.
the first upcrossing time at H for a given barrier13 H ∈ Et for some t ≤ T .
τuH is the first time the stock price reaches the barrier H from below and will
be important for up-options. Similarly we define τ dH – the first downcrossing
time at H useful for down-options. While the knock-in event activates the
option the knock-out event terminates it. Thus, the life time of the option
is determined by a stochastic event marked by above defined stopping times
and is not known from ex ante perspective. The time frame in which the
option can be exercised is then given by a stochastic interval [τ1, τ2[ defined
by:
[τ1, τ2[ :=
{
(s, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω ∣∣ τ1(ω) ≤ s < τ2(ω)} .
We will often write with slight abuse of notation 1[τ1,τ2[(ω) instead of 1[τ1,τ2[(t, ω).
With notations introduced above we are now ready to state the result
that will be the key for the analysis of payoffs with barrier feature.
Theorem 6. Let H1 < H2 be barriers defining first upscrossing times τ
u
1 and
τu2 , respectively. Consider a bounded payoff process X = (Xt)0,...,T defined by
Xt = x(t, St, τ
u
1 , τ
u
2 ) = A(t, St)1[τu1 ,τu2 [(t)
1. If A(t, ·) is decreasing in St for all t ≤ T , the multiple prior Snell
envelope is
UQ = U Pˆ
13Here, we assume that the barrier lies in the set of possible stock prices for some t ≤ T .
This assumption is not crucial and can be relaxed easily, see Hull (2006) for more detailed
review.
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where a worst-case measure Pˆ is defined by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τu1
(
εup+ (1− εu)
)
(1− p)
∏
u∈ ]τu1 , t]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T. The holder of the claim uses the optimal stopping rule
given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τu1 , τu2 [
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } .
2. If A(t, ·) is increasing in St for all t ≤ T , the multiple prior Snell
envelope is
UQ = U Pˆ
and the worst-case measure Pˆ is defined by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤t,τu2 ∧t or Su<H2·d
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t,Su≥H2·d
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T . An optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τu1 , T ]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } .
The proof will be given in appendix.
Remark 3. 1. Note that the worst-case measure is not unique since every
measure is optimal on events where the option has knocked out already.
In the theorem above we arbitrarily picked a measure on events, where
the payoff is constant.
2. A similar theorem that provides the worst-case measure for claims con-
ditioned on downcrossing times is stated and proven in the Appendix.
Also mixtures of both theorems including up- and downcrossing times
can be stated easily. Finally, analogous results hold for claims that con-
sist of sequences of barrier options. We will use the last result while
analyzing ladder options.
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3.3.1 Simple Barrier Options
With the above theorem the worst-case measures for barrier options follow as
simple corollaries. Here, we first analyze in-options. In-options need to reach
a barrier before they can be exercised. Thus, additional to the stock price
uncertainty there is knock-in uncertainty since there is a risk that the option
never knocks in leaving the buyer without a chance to exercise the claim. We
can see in options as claims having a fixed maturity but a stochastic start
determined by the knock-in event.
We start our discussion with the up-and-in put analyzing it in detail and
sketching the proof. However, we will omit the proofs and keep the discus-
sions short for remaining options as the reasoning is similar. An American
up-and-in put with strike K, and maturity T needs to be knocked-in from be-
low at the barrier H before it can be exercised by the buyer. When exercised
it pays
Xt = (K − St)+/(1 + r)t1[τuH ,T ]
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Corollary 1 (Up-and-in put). For an American up-and-in put option with
data as specified above the ambiguity averse agent uses the measure Pˆ defined
by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τuH
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
) ∏
u∈ ]τuH , t∧T ]
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
)
for t ≤ T.
Hence, the value of the option at time t from the perspective of the ambiguity
averse buyer is given by
UQt = U
Pˆ
t = E
Pˆ [Xτˆ | Ft], (3.5)
where τˆ is an optimal stopping time given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τuH , T ]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } .
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Proof. We apply Theorem 6 part 1. Set τu1 := τ
u
H and τ
u
2 := T + 1. The
discounted payoff process is given by Xt = (K −St)+/(1 + r)t1[τuH ,T+1[ for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Since A(t, St) := (K − St)+/(1 + r)t is monotone decreasing in St
for each t, Theorem 6 Part 1 applies.
As a consequence the value of the claim is given by
UQt = E
Pˆ [Xτˆ |Ft] = EP0
(
Xτˆ
Dˆτˆ
Dˆt
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
= EP0
[
EP0
(
Xτˆ
Dˆτˆ
DˆτuH
∣∣∣∣FτuH
)
DˆτuH
Dˆt
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EP
[
EP
[
Xτˆ | FτuH
] ∣∣Ft] , (3.6)
Especially at t = 0 we get
UQ0 = E
P
[
EP
[
Xτˆ | FτuH
] ∣∣F0]
= EP
[
EP [(K − Sτˆ )+/(1 + r)τˆ−τuH
∣∣FτH ]/(1 + r)τuH]
= EP
(
T∑
i=0
EP{τuH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )
+1{τuH=i}/(1 + r)
τˆ−τuH ]/(1 + r)τ
u
H
)
=
T∑
i=0
EP{τuH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )
+/(1 + r)τˆ−i]/(1 + r)iP (τuH = i)
=
T∑
i=0
EP{τdH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )
+/(1 + r)τˆ−i]/(1 + r)i
JH
i
(
i
i+JH
2
)
p
i+JH
2 (1− p) i−JH2 ,
(3.7)
where JH is the positive integer such that H = S0u
JH . For a derivation of
the formula used in the last line see Feller (1968). The expectation in the
last line denotes the value under ambiguity of an American plain vanilla put
starting at time i with initial price of the underlying Si = H.
The buyer of an up-and-in put uses a measure that is stochastic and has a
non-stationary structure. She changes her belief about the stock return when
the underlying hits the barrier anticipating low returns before the knock-in
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and high returns thereafter. The economic reason for this intuitively ap-
pealing behavior is the presence of an additional uncertainty caused by the
knock-in. Before that there is uncertainty about whether and when the op-
tion can be exercised. Once it is resolved there is uncertainty about the final
payoff as in the plain vanilla case. These uncertainty effects work in opposite
direction causing a change of the measure once the first effect disappears.
As a result the worst-case measure is a pasting of P and P at τuH and thus
cannot be fixed a priori.
Similar reasoning applies to a down-and-in call with barrier H < S0
paying of
Xt = (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[τ dH , T ]
for all t ≤ T :
Corollary 2 (Down-and-in call). The ambiguity averse agent uses the fol-
lowing prior Pˆ given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤t∧ τdH
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
) ∏
u∈]τdH , t∧T ]
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
)
for t ≤ T.
Similar to an up-and-in barrier put option a down-and-in barrier call
equals a plain vanilla call option once the underlying has hit the barrier level
H. As in (3.6) we can derive an analogous formula for the value process
(UQt )t=0,...,T of the down-and-in call option. For t ≤ τ dH we obtain
UQt = E
P
[
EP
[
Xτˆ | FτdH
] ∣∣Ft] , (3.8)
where τˆ is an optimal stopping time for this considered problem under the
measure Pˆ . Assuming pu + (1 − p)d ≥ 1 + r we get that τˆ = T is optimal,
see Corollary 4.6 in Riedel (2009).
The situation changes if one considers out-options. Here, the option can
be exercised by the buyer immediately after it is issued. However, once the
knock-out level is reached the buyer forfeits the exercise right. Here, the
issuance date of the option is fixed while the expiration is stochastic.
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For an up-and-out call paying of Xt := (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[0,τuH [ for all
t ≤ T we then get
Corollary 3 (Up-and-out call). The ambiguity averse buyer of an up-and-
out call uses the measure Pˆ defined by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤t,u≤τuH∧t or Su<H·d
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t,Su≥H·d
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T . In particular,
τ := inf
{
t < τuH |St ≥
H · d
(1 + r)T−t
+K
(
1− 1
(1 + r)T−t
)}
is optimal.
Proof. The agent uses the stated prior density due to Theorem (6) part 2.
The early exercise payoff at each time is bounded from above by H · d−K.
Therefore, early exercise at time t is optimal if
(St −K)(1 + r)T−t ≥ H · d−K
⇐⇒ St ≥ H · d
(1 + r)T−t
+K
(
1− 1
(1 + r)T−t
)
.
See also Reimer and Sandmann (1995).
Note that the early exercise condition is always satisfied if St = H · d.
Hence, the decision maker always exercises the option when there is knock-
out danger meaning that the option’s underlying might knock-out in the next
period. As a consequence, the decision maker does not directly experience
changes of the conditional one-step-ahead probabilities after the exercise.
The measure thus changes only once at the exercise. As in previous cases the
worst-case measures can be chosen arbitrarily after the exercise. However,
given the option is not exercised yet, the worst-case measure switches on the
events {St = H · d}. Thus, the worst-case measure and its uniqueness not
only depends on the realization of the stock price process but also on the
strategy used by investor.
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Remark 4. Assuming additionally in Corollary 3 that the inequality pu +
(1−p)d > 1+r is satisfied, the American up-and-out call is exactly exercised
the first time when St = H ·d. This can be derived by the following reasoning:
The value of the American up-and-out call under ambiguity being still alive
at a fixed time t with St ≤ H · d2 is larger or equal to
Ut ≥ 1
1 + r
EPˆ
(
(St+1 −K)+ | St ≤ H · d2
)
=
1
1 + r
EP
(
(St+1 −K)+ | St ≤ H · d2
)
=
1
1 + r
(
(St · u−K)+p+ (St · d−K)+(1− p)
)
≥ max
{
1
1 + r
(
(St · u−K)p+ (St · d−K)(1− p)
)
, 0
}
≥ max
{(
St − K
1 + r
)
, 0
}
≥ (St −K)+ for all St ≤ H · d2.
The first inequality follows by assumption pu + (1 − p)d > 1 + r. This
shows that the sufficient condition for early exercise is not satisfied for all
St ≤ H · d2. Thus, in this case early exercise is only optimal the first time
when the price equals H · d.
The analysis of down-and-out put is similar to the exercises we performed
above and will therefore be omitted here. There again, the worst-case mea-
sure is a pasting of P and P at the barrier. The remaining barrier options not
discussed here (there are four left) are covered by the above theorems. How-
ever, the discussion of the worst-case measure for them is even more simple
and can be reduced to the monotone case. There, the knock-in/knock-out
uncertainty and the stock price uncertainty work in the same direction for
those options making them monotone. They can be analyzed in the mono-
tone setting introduced by Riedel (2009).
3.3.2 Multiple Barrier Options
The above reasoning can also be applied to options endowed with more than
one barrier. As mentioned in Remark 3 one can use the theorems to obtain
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the worst-case measure for options with both a knock-in and a knock-out bar-
rier level, or for out-options having an additional barrier level which replaces
the original one after some time. A feature similar to this is typical for the
express certificate structure that is very common in the German structured
derivatives market.
In the following we analyze ladder options and focus on the special case of
an up-and-out ladder call option expiring at time T with two barrier levels H1
and H2. We assume S0 < H1 < H2. This claim resembles a single up-and-out
barrier call option with the additional feature that after some prespecified
date t1 ∈ (0, T ) the knock-out barrier changes from H1 to the higher level
H2. Hitting H1 after t1 does not lead to a knock-out. The stock price has to
reach H2 to become worthless after t1. The option thus pays of
Xt =

(St −K)+/(1 + r)t, if t ≤ t1 and t < τH1
(St −K)+/(1 + r)t, if t > t1, t < τH2 and t < τH1
0, else
= (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[0,τH1∧t1[ + (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[t1,τH2∧τH1 [
whereas τH1 := inf{t ∈ [0, t1]
∣∣St = H1} ∧ T + 1 and
τH2 := inf{t ∈ ]t1, T ]
∣∣St = H2} ∧ T + 1. Here, [t1, t1[ is defined as the empty
set.
As we will see, the additional barrier impacts the form of the worst-case
measure by influencing the optimal exercise strategy of the buyer. While the
buyer of a single barrier up-and-out call cashes the option as soon as H · d
is reached this might be not optimal here since she can get an even higher
payoff after t1. The higher return after the first barrier is dropped increases
the value option making waiting more attractive.
In order to represent the density of the worst-case measure we need the
following stopping times that indicate nodes at which a knock-out is possible
in the next period:
σi := inf{t ∈ [σi−1 + 1, τH1 ∧ t1 − 1[
∣∣St = H1 · d} ∧ T + 1
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for all 1 ≤ i < t1 with the notation σ0 := −1.
Corollary 4 (Ladder call option). Let all data be given as above, in partic-
ular, let us suppose the strict inequality of Corollary 3. Additionally, assume
that for all t ≤ t1
H1 · d/(1 + r)t < EP (Ut+1|St = H1 · d) (3.9)
Then the ambiguity averse buyer of this ladder option uses the measure Pˆ
specified by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤τH2∧t: u6=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u≤T : u=σi+1 or u∈ ]τH2 ,t]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all occurring 1 ≤ i < t1.
Proof. We can also apply the second part of the theorem to this special
situation since the time interval [0, T ] is divided into two disjoint intervals
and A(t, St) := (St − K)+/(1 + r)t, increases in St for all t ≤ T on both
intervals. Thus, applying the theorem on both subintervals yields the density
for the ambiguity averse agent. From t1 on same arguments as in the case
of an usual up-and-out call option (see Corollary 3) lead to the worst-case
measure along with an optimal stopping time.
In the case of the up-and-in call the measure changes only once if the
buyer exercises the option optimally. The situation differs here because it
can be optimal to hold on to the option even if it can knock-out in the next
period. The worst-case measure here is thus the one with the lowest mean
returns at nodes from which the option can be knocked out, i.e. nodes with
St = H1 · d for t < t1 and St = H2 · d afterwards. Once the stock price is
below this threshold the conditional probability switches back to the marginal
probability with the lowest returns. Of course, the so defined measure is also
a worst-case measure for the case of the up-and-in call.
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3.4 Multiple Expiry Options
While in the previous section uncertainty came from stochastic events that
couldn’t be controlled by the investor, here we consider claims where the
holder can partially control and switch off one source of uncertainty. We
analyze claims where the owner of the option has the right to modify the
contract conditions resetting the strike or the maturity in a predefined way.
New conditions of the contract depend on the underlying’s value at switching
dates and are not known to the buyer at time zero. Therefore, additional
to the uncertainty about future underlying’s value the decision maker faces
uncertainty about future contract conditions while evaluating the option a
priori. The expiry dates can be predefined points in time (forward start
options) or random dates chosen by the buyer or seller of the contract (shout
options).
Such options can be seen as a sequence of claims where every claim expires
at a predefined date and pays off a new born claim expiring at the next expiry
date. In the case of European claims the expiry dates are deterministic
corresponding to forward start options. In the case of shout options we face
American claims leading to stochastic expiry dates. In general, multiple
expiry options can be entitled with any number of expiry dates, here, we
consider dual expiry options where contract conditions change exactly once
14.
3.4.1 Shout Options
Shout options are contracts that give the buyer the right to reset the strike
at a date chosen by her. The event of resetting the contract features is
called shouting and gives the structure its name. The reset right allows the
14Kwok and Wu (2004) analyze shout options with infinite number of shout possibilities
and establishes a relation to lookback options.
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investor to benefit from market movements by choosing a favorable strike.
At the same time she can lock in already realized profits ensuring against an
unfavorable stock movement.
Shout options are often used by professional investors as a cheaper alternative
to lookback options. Whereas the buyer of the lookback option has the right
to sell the stock at the maximal price the owner of the shout option has
to call her bank and to freeze the price at which she can sell/buy at any
time σ ≤ T prior to maturity. Mathematically, the buyer faces an optimal
stopping problem, aiming to set the strike optimally.
In the following we analyze shout floors. The same analysis can be per-
formed for call options.
At time zero the buyer receives a put option with an unspecified strike.
This strike is set to be the stock price at a date chosen by the buyer. Thus,
the buyer has to call his bank and to freeze the strike when she thinks that
the strike is favorable. The buyer shouts once at σ ≤ T fixing the strike at
Sσ. At the expiry date she receives a payoff that corresponds to the payoff
profile of an European put i.e. (Sσ − ST )+. Thus, the buyer of this shout
option has to solve the following problem
Maximize min
P∈Q
EP ((Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T ) over all stopping times σ ≤ T
(3.10)
Note, that unlike the American put, the exercise date is fixed but the birth
date has to be determined optimally by the buyer. Determining the optimal
starting time/shouting time constitutes the optimal stopping problem for the
single shout option. The task is to optimally start the payoff process rather
then stop it which can be seen as purchasing a new issued European option
with a fixed maturity. We will maintain this parallel during our analysis.
However, we cannot apply our standard theory of backward induction to
the problem stated in (3.10) because the payoff (Sσ−ST )+/(1+r)T obtained
from stopping at any stopping time σ ≤ T depends on the value of the stock
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at maturity and is for this reason not adapted to the filtration (Ft)t=1,...,T
generated by the path. To overcome this difficulty we condition the payoff
on the available information and consider the following payoff process
Xt = min
P∈Q
EP ((St − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft). (3.11)
For every t ≤ T we can interpret Xt as discounted multiple prior value of
the shout floor if shouted at t. At the same time it corresponds to the value
of an at-the-money European put issued at t and maturing at T evaluated
under multiple priors.15
With the same arguments that we used to prove Lemma (1) we get
Lemma 6. For all stopping times σ ≤ T we have
min
P∈Q
EP ((Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T ) = min
P∈Q
EP (Xσ) (3.12)
Therefore, we can reformulate the problem stated in (3.10) equivalently
in the following way
Maximize min
P∈Q
EP ((Xσ) over all stopping times σ < T (3.13)
where the payoff process X is defined via (3.11). Thus, the optimal stopping
time found for (3.13) is also optimal for the problem (3.10) and the values of
the two problems coincide. Again, we can interpret the problem as optimal
investment in a put with a fixed investment horizon.
As in Chapter 2 we solve the problem in two steps: first we compute Xt
– the explicit value of the shout option freezed at t for all t ≤ T and derive
the worst-case measure after shouting. In the second step, we identify the
worst-case measure before shouting reducing the problem to the single prior
case.
15Strictly speaking, the value of the European put issued at t and maturing at T differs
from the expression 3.11 by a discount term
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Lemma 7. The adapted payoff process corresponding to the optimal shouting
problem (3.13) satisfies
Xt =x(St, t, P ) (3.14)
and is homogeneous of degree 1 in St for every t ≤ T . Moreover, the optimal
shouting rule σ∗ for the problem is the same as the optimal stopping rule for
the Bayesian problem
Maximize EP (Xσ)
under the measure P over all shouting times σ < T .
Proof. To compute Xt for a fixed t ≤ T we note that the uncertainty about
the strike is resolved at the time of shouting. The strike becomes a constant
and as a consequence the claim becomes a plain vanilla European put. As the
payoff of the put is decreasing in St for all t ≤ T by Theorem 5 we conclude
that the worst-case measure is given by P and we have
Xt = min
P∈Q
EP
(
(St − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft
)
=EP ((St − ST ))+/(1 + r)T |Ft).
Additionally, under P the increments of the underlying between t and T –
∆(St, ST ) are independent for all t ≤ T which leads to
Xt =St · EP ((1−∆(St, ST ))+/(1 + r)T |Ft) (3.15)
=:St · g(τ)
where τ = T − t and
g(τ) = (1 + r)−T · (1− p)τ
k∗(τ)∑
k=0
(
τ
k
)(
p
1− p
)k (
1− dτ−2k)
with k∗(t) =: max
{
k : k < τ
2
}
.
The above equation provides the value of the embedded option contained
in the shout contract maturing at T at the time of shouting. At the same
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time it corresponds to the value of the at-the-money European put issued at
t ≤ T and maturing at T .
The buyer of a shout option uses P to evaluate the option after shouting.
Moreover, the value of a freezed shout floor is homogeneous of degree one in
the current stock price St.
As g(τ) > 0 for all τ > 0 for every t ≤ T x(·, t) is increasing in St. Again
using Theorem (5) we conclude that the worst-case measure of problem (3.13)
is given by P .
Remark 5. It might be surprising at the first sight that the value of the option
is monotone increasing in the strike since the opposite is true for put options.
The reason for this is the fact that the strike is not a constant at the moment
of issuance of the option. The value of the claim at the time of shouting is
increasing with respect to the difference between strike and the current stock
price. Economically, a higher St at the time of shouting increases the strike
of the new born option enlarging the in-the-money region of the option.
From the discussion above we can already derive the worst-case measure
for shout claims:
Corollary 5 (Shout put). A risk-neutral buyer of an single shout floor option
uses the optimal stopping rule for the prior Pˆ given by the density
Dˆt = 2
t
σ∗∧t∏
v=1
(
p · v + (1− p) · (1− v)
) t∏
v=σ∗+1
(
p · v + (1− p) · (1− v)
)
where σ∗ denotes the stopping time solving (3.13).
Summing up, we conclude that the value of the shout floor is given by
UQt =
{
EP
(
EP
(
(S∗σ − ST )+/(1 + r)T |F∗σ
) |Ft) , if t < σ
EP
(
(S∗σ − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft
)
else
The decision maker changes her beliefs about mean returns at the first expiry
date. Before shouting and freezing the strike she presumes low returns of the
stock that keeps the in-the-money region of the option small and decreases
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the value of the embedded put; after shouting she receives a put option and
therefore changes her belief — being pessimistic, she now presumes that the
risky asset will have high returns. This change of beliefs causes the difference
in the values of the classical result and the multiple prior result.
To complete the analysis it remains to solve the optimal stopping problem
for X under the worst-case measure. The classical solution for the continu-
ous time setting was provided by Kwok and Wu (2004). To our knowledge
binomial tree analysis has not been conducted for shout options yet.
Lemma 8. Denote by µ the mean return under P i.e. µ = p · u+ (1− p) · d
and by x∗ the maximum of the function g(τ) · µT−τ where g(τ) is defined as
above. Then an optimal stopping time is given by
σ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|g(τ) · µT−τ = x∗}
If the maximum x∗ is unique, then all σ∗ ≤ t ≤ T − 1 are optimal.
Proof. To prove the lemma we use the generalized parking technique intro-
duced by Lerche, Keener, and Woodroofe (1994). For all t ≤ T , τ = T − t
we have
EP (St · g(τ)) = EP
(
St
µt
· g(τ)µt
)
≤ EP
(
St
µt
· x∗
)
and equality holds for the maximizer t∗. Now since St
µt
is a P -martingale we
get for all stopping times σ < T
EP
(
Sσ
µσ
· x∗
)
= S0 · x∗
and therefore
V0 = sup
σ<T
EP (Sσ · g(τ)) = EP (S∗t · g(T − t∗))
where t∗ satisfies g(T − t∗) · µt∗ = x∗.
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The optimal stopping rule is deterministic and does not depend on the
level of the stock price S. This follows from the homogeneity of the payoff in
S. However, the time of stopping depends highly on the model parameters
u, p, p. We suspect that function g(τ) · µT−τ is quasiconcave and thus have
a unique maximum but we are not able to prove it. However, can state a
sufficient condition for immediate stopping.
Corollary 6. In the above situation we have σ∗ = 0 if 1− p ≥ µ.
While in the classical CRR market the stopping time depends only on
the one step mean return, in the multiple prior model the relation of p and
p plays a crucial role.
3.5 Quasi-convex Payoffs
In the last section we consider options whose payoffs consist of two mono-
tone parts. Typical examples are options having U–shaped payoff including
straddles, strangles or short option strategies. Investors buying such options
are speculating on change in the underlying’s value without specifying the
direction of the change. Depending on the actual price of the underlying
falling or rising stock increases the profit of the investor. To illustrate this
idea consider a straddle: by exercising the straddle at St > K the buyer gets
a payment of (St −K) which corresponds to a call. Otherwise, if S − t < K
she gets the payoff of a put – (K − St). The first part of the payoff is often
called the call leg, the second the put leg. As the monotonicity on both legs
of the payoff is different, the worst-case measure is also different depending
on the actual stock price at the moment of the valuation.
Remark 6. Mathematically, payoffs described above correspond to quasi-
convex/quasi-concave payoff functions. Note, that we still deal with functions
discretely defined and have to be careful when using the term quasi-convex.
Strictly speaking, the notion we use corresponds to discrete convexity studied
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intensively in the context of indivisible goods (see for example Murota (1998)
for a general introduction). In one dimensional setting discrete convexity
reduces to the following: A set E ⊂ N is convex if all points in E are con-
tained in the convex hull of E. The definition of quasi-convex is then straight
forward.
We show that the Snell envelope UQt at time t ≤ T is a quasi-convex
function in St if the claim is Markovian.
Lemma 9. If the discounted payoff function A(t, St) is quasi-convex in its
second variable for every t ≤ T , then the Snell envelope UQt is given by a
quasi-convex function v(t, x), i.e. given St = xt
UQt = v(t, xt) = sup
τ≥t
min
P∈Q
EP (A(τ, Sτ )|St = xt)
Proof. We have to show that for every t ≤ T the value function v(t, ·) depends
only on the value of the stock at time t and that the quasi-convexity of the
payoff function carries over to the value function. We do it via backward
induction.
Before applying backward induction we note that in our case a function
g : E → N is quasi-convex if and only if there exists a xˆ ∈ E such that
g(x) ≥ g(xˆ) holds for all x ∈ E.
Now to the backward induction. For t = T we clearly have for all possible
values of ST = xT
UQT = A(T, xT )
where A(T, ·) is a quasi-convex function.
For t+1 < T we assume that for any value of St+1 = xt+1 ∈ Et+1 the value
function v(t + 1, ·) is quasi-convex function depending only on the current
value of the stock. Because of quasi-convexity there exists a unique minimum
mt+1 and a unique
xˆt+1 = inf{xt+1 ∈ Et+1|v(t+ 1, xt+1) = mt+1}.
The function v(t+ 1, ·) is decreasing on the set {xt+1 ≤ xˆt+1} and increasing
on the set {xt+1 ≥ xˆt+1}.
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In t < T we then have for any value St = xt
UQt = max{A(t, St),min
P∈Q
EP
(
UQt+1|Ft
)}
= max{A(t, xt),min
P∈Q
EP
(
UQt+1|St = xt
)}
= max {A(t, xt), pˆt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pˆt+1)v(t+ 1, xt · d)}
= v(t, xt)
(3.16)
where pˆt+1 ∈ [p, p] is the marginal of the worst-case measure Pˆ at time
t. Since v(t + 1, ·) is independent of the realized past by assumption, the
minimizer pˆt+1 depends only on the value of xt. This proves that the value
function at time t v(t, ·) depends only on current value of the underlying.
To prove quasi-convexity we analyze the structure of the continuation
value in equation (3.16)
u(t, xt) := pˆt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pˆt+1)v(t+ 1, xt · d)
for different values of St = xt.
On the set
Edt = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d} (3.17)
we have
xt · d < xt · u < xˆt+1
and therefore using the induction hypothesis we can conclude that the func-
tion u(t+ 1, ·) is decreasing as a convex combination of two increasing func-
tions. Similarly, for all
Eit = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u} (3.18)
we have xˆt+1 < xt ·d < xt ·u and the function increases on the above set with
the same argument.
Because of the binomial tree structure of the state space and the fact that
Et+1 = {Et · uk|k ∈ {−1; 1}}
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equations (3.17) and (3.18) partition the set of possible values of St and Et
can be written as
Et = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d} ∪ {xt ∈ Et|xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u}
Because of monotonicity of u(t, ·) on Edt and Eit the minimum of u(t, ·) is
unique. This shows that the function u(t, ·) is quasi-convex.
To complete the proof we recall that A(t, xt) is quasi-convex by assump-
tion. Thus, the function defined by equation (3.16) is a quasi-convex function
as maximum of two quasi-convex functions. Clearly, the value function at
time t depends only on the current stock price and given St = xt we can
write UQ as a function v(t, xt).
The quasi-convexity of the value function implies that for every t ≤ T
we can separate the space Et on which the value of the claim is monotone
allowing to determine the worst-case measure. The decomposition point is
the minimizer of the value function xˆt which is constructed in the proof of
Lemma 9.
Having analyzed the shape of the value function we now can compute
the worst-case measure with the following argument. If asset prices are low,
the value function is decreasing. Therefore, with the same argument as for
simple American options, one can show that P is the worst-case measure
here. In the other region on the contrary, P is the worst-case measure. At
a predefined level xˆt the investor changes his beliefs and so the mean return
on stock under the measure. We then have the following
Lemma 10 (Straddle). The buyer of a straddle uses the optimal stopping
rule for the measure Pˆ with density
Dˆt = 2
t
∏
v≤t,Sv∈Eiv
(
p · v + (1− p) · (1− v)
) ∏
v≤t,Sv∈Edv
(
p · v + (1− p) · (1− v)
)
.
Proof. We consider the value function on the continuation region where for
a given St = xt we have U
Q
t = v(t, xt)
v(t, xt) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
(pt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pt+1)v(t+ 1, St · d)
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As v(t, ·) is decreasing on Edt , the worst-case measure on this set is given by
P . With the same argument the worst-case measure Pˆ is P on Eit , i.e.
Pˆ [t+1 = 1|Ft] =
{
p on {xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u}
p on {xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d}
. (3.19)
where xˆt+1 is the minimizer of v(t+ 1, ·). Using the definition of p and p and
pasting the densities together one obtains the result.
Under Pˆ the process (St) becomes mean-reverting in an appropriate sense
pushing St down if it is high and up if it is low. This corresponds to the
intuition: the ambiguity averse decision maker anticipates low mean returns
in bull market phases and high mean returns when the stock value is low.
Unlike previous cases the uncertainty about the payoff function here cannot
be resolved before T in general. The change of the measure occurs every
time the stock price crosses the critical value xˆt forcing the decision maker
to change her beliefs about mean returns.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the worst-case measures that arise if one considers var-
ious American options in a framework that allows for model uncertainty in
discrete time. The imprecise information about the correct probability mea-
sure driving the stock price process in the market generates different models
with varying conditional one-step-ahead probabilities used by the buyer. The
buyer is then allowed to change the measure, and so the model she uses and
to assign the value to the claim according to the worst possible model. While
the solution for plain vanilla options is straightforward in the model the sit-
uation differs if the payoff of the option becomes more sophisticated. The
effect of uncertainty differs over time leading to a dynamical structure of
the worst-case measure. This paper analyzes different effects of uncertainty
highlighting the structural difference between the standard models used in
71
3.6. CONCLUSION
Finance and the multiple prior models: the buyer of the option adapts her
beliefs to the state of the world and the overall effect of model uncertainty.
A natural next step is to extend the theory to continuous market models and
to analyze exotic options in that framework.
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Chapter 4
Ambiguity Aversion and
Overpricing
4.1 Introduction
The main goal of the Chapter is to highlight the impact of ambiguity on
market prices in a static market model with heterogeneous agents. We show
that the presence of ambiguity averse agents can lead to higher prices of the
asset.
Classical asset pricing literature relies heavily on the assumption that
agents have homogeneous correct expectations about future returns. Lintner
(1969) first analyzes a partial equilibrium model where agents have hetero-
geneous beliefs about the profitability of the asset. It turns out that the
equilibrium price corresponds to the weighted average of opinions of market
participants. While bullish (optimistic) investors demand security, bearish
(pessimistic) investors supply it by shortselling. In equilibrium the price re-
flects the average opinion on the market. In this setting, Miller (1977) and
Jarrow (1980) analyze the effect of short selling constraints on the equilibrium
price and show that short selling constraint together with heterogeneous ex-
pectations may lead to overpricing. Since pessimistic agents cannot express
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their beliefs by selling the asset short, the price is biased upward and reflects
the opinion of more optimistic agents. If this trend is not corrected over
several periods a bubble can arise.
This idea gave rise to a series of papers analyzing bubbles and speculative
overpricing caused by heterogeneous beliefs. Harrison and Kreps (1978) con-
structed a speculative bubble model in discrete time, Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) modeled overpricing as a consequence of overconfidence in continuous
time. However, all papers explaining bubbles by heterogeneity of agents rely
on the impossibility of short selling. This restriction is set exogenously and
is justified by the market structure, high costs of short selling or regulation.
The assumption which seems reasonable in some situations is hard to support
in general. Most of developed financial markets explicitly allow short selling,
a vast majority of stocks traded on exchanges is shortable at low cost1. At
the same time short supply, i.e. the supply generated through short selling
constitutes only a small fraction of the market. Based on an empirical anal-
ysis Lamont and Stein (2004) come to the conclusion that ”..the problem is
not too much short selling in falling markets ... but rather, too little in rising
markets”. To explain this phenomena authors refer to internal restrictions
set by companies’ chartas or reluctance to sell short. However, there is no
model rationalizing this reluctance to sell short.
In this Chapter we relax the assumption of impossibility of short selling
and establish the reluctance to sell the asset short through preferences. The
reluctance to short sell is not an exogenously given attitude as before but
comes as optimal behavior of agents that have certain preferences. To model
this we use ambiguity averse preference in the sense of Knight, axiomatized
by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Already Miller (1977) in his paper referred to Knightian uncertainty and
pointed out that ”[i]n practice, uncertainty, divergence of opinion about a
1A review of short selling constraints over the world can be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson
(2008).
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security’s return, and risk go together”. Thus, in markets where agents have
different views on the asset at least some market participants are likely to
experience uncertainty and behave like ambiguity averse agents. We formalize
this idea and analyze a market where heterogeneous agents face risk and
uncertainty.
We assume that some market participants are subjective utility maximizer
(SEU) that differ in their expectation on the security’s return while others
have minimax preferences axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). An
ambiguity averse decision maker (AA) uses a class of models instead of one to
assess utilities to future payoff streams and commits to a position only if the
expected utility of this position is positive for all models she considers. In this
setting both types of agents determine their demand for the risky/uncertain
security by solving their utility maximization problem. Subjective utility
maximizers then demand the security if the price is below their subjective
expected return and supply it otherwise. In any case they hold a position
of the security except for the knife edge case. The picture is different for
ambiguity averse investors: there exists an interval of prices within which it
is optimal for them to hold zero position in the security. This so called no
trade interval first studied by Dow and Werlang (1992) arises because the
expected utility of a short and long position is positive for some but not
for all models the investors takes into account. As a result the ambiguity
averse investor refuses to participate in the market at all. This has two
implications: First, the agents do not demand the asset and the risk has to
be taken by fewer investors. This leads to higher risk premia required by
investors to hold the asset. This effect has been studied extensively in the
non-participation literature. On the other hand, the ambiguity averse agents
also refuse to short the asset and fail to generate short supply. Thus the
supply is lower compared to a market with SEU agents only. This can lead
to higher equilibrium prices. Even though short selling is not forbidden, an
upward biased price (compared to the average risk adjusted valuation) can
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arise if subjective utility maximizers are overly optimistic and bid the price
up. As a result an increase in ambiguity may force ambiguity averse decision
maker to stop short selling and thus increase the equilibrium price. This effect
does not arise in the previous equilibrium models with ambiguity where an
increase in ambiguity decreases demand and leads to lower equilibrium prices.
The result is an extension of the series of papers following the ideas of
Miller (1977). Unlike previous papers on overpricing we do not impose the
short selling assumption exogenously. Here, it is a result of a rational utility
maximization of agents having minimax preferences.
Several papers investigate the impact of ambiguity on the portfolio and in-
vestment choice and its consequences for markets. Epstein and Wang (1994)
use ambiguity aversion and no trade interval to explain non participation in
the markets and portfolio inertia. It is showed to be a reason for underdiver-
sification in Uppal and Wang (2003) and market incompleteness in Mukerji
and Tallon (2001). Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) highlights the role
of ambiguity in flights to quality. In the latter model an increase in ambiguity
that is unrelated to fundamental value causes a sell out in the security press-
ing the price down and resulting in a flight to quality. Ui (2009) studies a
model of non-participation in a financial market with finitely many different
potential investors who exhibit heterogeneous levels of ambiguity and obtain
private signals. As Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) and Easley and O’Hara
(2009) they also note that equity premium can decrease if non-participation
arises. This happens because investors that exhibit higher levels of ambigu-
ity aversion and therefore demand a higher premium for holding the asset
leave the market. This decreases the average premium required to hold the
security. The heterogeneity in this models refers to different degrees of uncer-
tainty aversion of the investors and not to their point estimate of the returns
of the asset.
Our approach differs from this literature in two aspects. First, non-
participation literature concentrates on the interaction of ambiguity averse
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and perfectly rational agents having correct beliefs for the asset return. In
contrast, we study the interaction of ambiguity averse decision makers with
heterogeneous risk averse agents. As a result we do not assume anyone being
rational and having correct beliefs. The prices on the market reflect solely
average beliefs and not necessarily fundamental values. All our predictions
about the changes of the equilibrium price are made with respect to the
average opinion and not with respect to the fundamental value.
Second, previous models on ambiguity aversion in equilibrium models sug-
gest that the presence of ambiguity averse decision makers results in lower
prices since ambiguity aversion increases the premium required by the in-
vestor to hold the asset. In our model ambiguity can cause a price increase.
As more agents become ambiguity averse or ambiguity about the return of
investment increases, more investors become reluctant to short the asset,
thus lowering the supply of the asset. If SEU agents are optimistic enough
the effect of lower supply is stronger than the effect of lower demand. In
equilibrium we get higher prices.
Our approach can also be seen in the spirit of limits of arbitrage studied
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). There, rational arbitrageurs refuse to correct
a bubble and to take advantage of an arbitrage because this arbitrage is
risky. They only step in if the mispricing is high enough to be rewarded for
the risk they take. Our story is similar: the arbitrage here is not only risky
but also ambiguous. Moreover, given the price is in the no trade interval,
a short position in the security is arbitrage for some models an ambiguity
averse decision maker takes into account but not in all. Similar to Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) overpricing can persist due to its ambiguous nature.
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Setup
We consider a two period exchange economy with two assets: one ambiguous
and one riskfree. The risky asset is traded at t = 0 and pays a liquidating2
dividend x at time t = 1. The supply of the asset is fixed at Q while demand
is determined by the maximization problem of investors. The riskfree asset
is traded in infinite supply at a given riskfree rate 3.
There is a continuum of risk averse agents in the economy that share the
same v NM index defining the CARA utility with risk aversion coefficient γ:
u(x) = −e−γx. (4.1)
Investors that take prices as given differ in their beliefs about returns on
stock and their attitude towards uncertainty. There are two types of in-
vestors: subjective utility maximizer (SEU agents) that maximize their ex-
pected utility under their subjective belief and ambiguity averse decision
maker (AA agents) that take a class of models into account since they do not
trust the validity of one particular model.
While all market participants agree that the dividend in the next period
is normally distributed with volatility σ they disagree about the expected
return µ of the asset. This disagreement might be a result of overconfidence
in own ability to evaluate signals as the model of Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) suggests or be the result of the use of different models.
The range of possible drifts is given by [µ, µ], investors are distributed
across this interval according to a distribution M having a density m.
2To set up a meaningful static model we assume that the risky asset is withdrawn from
the market and has zero value after paying the dividend at time t = 1.
3We consider a partial equilibrium model and set the riskfree rate as exogenous.
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4.2.2 Maximization Problem
Subjective expected utility investors
Heterogeneous risk averse agents agree to disagree about the asset’s return.
Each risk averse investor has a point estimate µi for the expected return which
he uses for his evaluations. For expositional simplicity we assume that risk
averse investors are optimists, having a belief above some threshold µˆ ∈ [µ, µ].
From the modeling point of view this assumption seems reasonable since
agents that are optimistic about the returns on a new security are also likely
to be confident about the choice of their model. An example for this type
of behavior was the overoptimism combined with a high level of confidence
during the Internet bubble. The assumption made here is not crucial for the
validity of the result but simplifies greatly the analysis. We will discuss how
to relax it later on.
Given the belief µi the agent maximizes her expected utility. Due to the
shape of the utility function endowments of agents do not affect their demand
for the risky asset. The problem of the SEU investor with belief µi then reads
Maximize Ei(− exp(−γdsi (x− p))) over di ∈ R (4.2)
where p denotes the equilibrium price of the asset and dsi the number of risky
asset in the portfolio. The expectation is taken with respect to her personal
belief µi. Note that unlike the seminal paper of Miller (1977) we do allow for
short selling, i.e. negative values of di. Thus, depending on the equilibrium
price, the agent can be either supplier or demander of the risky asset.
Standard techniques show that the demand of the investor i is given by
dsi =
µi − p
γσ2
(4.3)
An SEU agents is a net demander of the asset if the price is below the mean
return and a net supplier if the price is above. In any case the optimal position
in the asset is nonzero except for the knife edge case µi = p. Thus, SEU
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agents are always active on the market trading in one or other direction and
generating both demand and short sell supply depending on the individual
belief µi.
Using the mean value theorem the aggregate demand of SEU investors
can be calculated as
Ds =
∫ µ
µˆ
dim(dµi) (4.4)
=
∫ µ
µˆ
µi − p
γσ2
m(dµi) (4.5)
=
µ+ k∗ − p
γσ2
(1−M(µˆ)) (4.6)
where k∗ ∈ [µˆ− µ, µ− µˆ]. The demand of SEU agents is determined by the
weighted average of opinions of SEU agents µ+ k∗ and the mass of the SEU
agents in the economy (1−M(µˆ)).
Ambiguity averse investors
An ambiguity averse decision maker is uncertain about the right model and
takes a set of models into account. Instead of using their own model ambigu-
ity averse decision maker use all models that they see on the market. More
precisely, they build a belief about the return and if the belief is below the
ambiguity threshold µˆ they use all estimates they see on the market to assess
the profitability. Thus, the set of priors used by ambiguity averse agents is
given by
Q = {P : xP ∼ N (µ, σ2), µ ∈ [µ, µ]} (4.7)
Being ambiguity averse she maximizes her minimal expected payoff, i.e.
Maximize inf
P∈Q
EP (− exp(−γdi(x− p))) over di ∈ R (4.8)
where Q is defined by (4.7). It is known from Dow and Werlang (1992)
that the demand function of the ambiguity averse investor is continuous and
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has kinks at p = µ and p = µ. The ambiguity generates a so called no
trade interval, in which the agents refuse to trade the risky asset. The exact
expression for the demand function of an ambiguity averse agent in our setting
is given by
da =

µ−p
γσ2
if p < µ
0 if µ < p < µ
µ−p
γσ2
if p > µ
. (4.9)
The ambiguity averse investor demands the asset if the equilibrium price is
low enough. However, if the price is sufficiently high, i.e. p > µ the ambiguity
averse agents refuses to invest in risky asset. Unlike the SEU agent who
starts short selling as soon as she stops buying, ambiguity averse agent is
also reluctant to short sell the asset at a price p ∈ [µ, µ]. Thus, ambiguity
has two effects: first, if the price is above µ ambiguity averse agents stop
investing in the asset, decreasing aggregate demand, on the other hand, they
do not start short selling thus decreasing supply of the asset.
Clearly, the aggregate demand of ambiguity averse agents is then given
by
Da =
∫ µˆ
µ
dam(dµi) (4.10)
4.2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Before we perform equilibrium analysis we note that the demand is only
positive if p < µ since all agent aim to sell the asset if p > µ. Thus, in equi-
librium ambiguity averse agents will never short the asset since the price for
the risky asset will never exceed the most optimistic valuation µ in equilib-
rium. Therefore, the demand of an ambiguity averse investor in equilibrium
is
da = max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(4.11)
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Then, the aggregate demand of ambiguity averse decision makers amounts
to
Da =
∫ µˆ
µ
max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
m(dµi) (4.12)
=M(µˆ) max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(4.13)
Ambiguity aversion has the equilibrium effect of preventing short selling by
ambiguity averse agents. Aggregate demand of ambiguity averse agents cor-
responds to the demand in Miller (1977) where short selling restrictions
where imposed exogenously. While ambiguity averse agents are internally
constrained and only act as demander of the asset, SEU agents sell short if
the price is high enough. The aggregate demand for the risky asset in the
economy is given by the demand of the two groups of investors
D = Ds +Da (4.14)
In equilibrium,
D = Q (4.15)
and we have the following lemma:
Lemma 11. Under above conditions there exists a unique equilibrium in the
market for the risky/uncertain asset with equilibrium price given by
p =
{
µ+ k∗(1−M(µˆ))−Qγσ2 if k∗(1−M(µˆ)) < Qγσ2
µ+ k∗ − Qγσ2
1−M(µˆ) else
. (4.16)
The first value in the above equation corresponds to the price when the
ambiguity averse agents demand positive amounts of the asset, i.e. p < µ
and no short selling takes place. This price would arise in an unconstrained
economy with unconstrained SEU maximizers M(µˆ) of them having belief µ
and the price equals the average opinion of all market participants .
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The second value is the constrained equilibrium price when ambiguity
averse agents do not demand the risky asset. Since the risk adjusted return
of a long position in the worst case scenario is negative ambiguity averse
agents do not demand the security and stay away from the market leaving
it to the overly optimistic investors. However, they are reluctant to short
sell the asset since the worst case return of the short position is negative as
well. The price reflects the valuation of SEU agents only leading to a higher
equilibrium price than in the pure heterogeneous expectation case. The effect
of the reluctance to short sell is twofold. On the one hand, ambiguity averse
agents stop demanding the asset, decreasing the scarcity of the asset by
shifting the demand downwards. This potentially decreases the price. On
the other hand, the agents with optimistic beliefs demand higher amounts of
the asset causing higher prices.
4.3 Comparison with Miller (1977)
In this section we compare our results to the findings of Miller (1977). Re-
call that Miller (1977) assumed that heterogeneous investors are uniformly
distributed across
[µ, µ] = [µˆ− k, µˆ+ k] (4.17)
The riskfree rate is zero and short selling is not allowed in this market. The
maximization problem of the investor with belief µi then becomes
Maximize Ei(− exp(−γdi(x− p))) over di ∈ R+ (4.18)
and the individual demand amounts to
ds = max
{
µi − p
γσ2
, 0
}
(4.19)
83
4.4. COMPARATIVE STATICS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Aggregating over all investors and solving for equilibrium yields
p =
{
µˆ−Qγσ2 if k < γσ2Q
µˆ+ k − 2√kQγσ2 else . (4.20)
The first value in the above equation denotes the equilibrium price that arises
if the short selling constraint does not bind. The second value is the price
resulting in the constrained equilibrium. Here, some of investors aim to hold
negative amounts of the security but are prevented from it by the short selling
constraint. It can be easily checked that the constrained price is higher than
the unconstrained.
To compare our results we assume that the set of all possible beliefs
is given by (4.17), where µˆ denotes the ambiguity threshold and M is the
uniform. Using Lemma 4.2.3 we can compute the equilibrium price as
p =
{
4µ−k
4
−Qγσ2 if k < 4
3
Qγσ2
2µ+k
2
− 2Qγσ2 else .
Note that the price in our setting is always below the price in the setting
of Miller (1977). This happens for two reasons. First, the average expected
return in our model is lower due to the presence of ambiguity averse investors.
This leads to a lower price in the unconstrained equilibrium. Second, while
the model of Miller completely excludes short selling, some short selling takes
place in our model in the restricted equilibrium. The opinion of moderate
investors that aim to go short is contained in the restricted price of our model.
Since some short selling is executed by moderate investors with belief µi such
that p > µi > µˆ, the overpricing is not as severe as in the model of Miller.
4.4 Comparative Statics and Sensitivity Anal-
ysis
In the next section we analyze how a change of parameters changes the
equilibrium price. Our main goal is to study the impact of ambiguity on the
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equilibrium price in the meaningful way.
4.4.1 Sensitivity with respect to ambiguity increase
While classical equilibrium models4 with ambiguity predict that an increase
in ambiguity lowers the equilibrium prices the situation differs here. The
two main factors for the sensitivity analysis is the distribution of opinions
and the ambiguity threshold. First we analyze the sensitivity of the price
with respect to changes in ambiguity and distribution of opinions. We study
how the change in ambiguity threshold affects the equilibrium price, assuming
that the distribution remains the same. This can happen due to an exogenous
shock on the market such as an unexpected market outcome causing more
agents to doubt their models.
Lemma 12. Denote by pu = µ + k∗(1 − M(µˆ)) − Qγσ2 the unrestricted
equilibrium price and by pc = µ+k∗− Qγσ2
1−M(µˆ) the restricted equilibrium price.
Then pu and pc satisfy
1. dp
u
dµˆ
< 0 and
2. dp
c
dµˆ
> 0
An increase in ambiguity caused by an increase of the ambiguity threshold
lowers the prices in the unconstrained equilibrium. This result is intuitive,
since all investor participate in the market and demand the asset. The de-
crease in µˆ decreases the average expected return and thus the aggregate
demand. This result is in line with the literature. In the constrained equilib-
rium however, the picture is different. Here, an increase in ambiguity leads
to higher prices on the market. This happens for the following reason. On
the one hand the increase of the ambiguity threshold forces some market par-
ticipants into the no trade interval and the market becomes smaller. At the
same time moderate agents who where willing to short sell before are now
4 See Epstein and Wang (1994) and references therein.
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in the no trade interval and fail to generate short sale supply. If the concen-
tration of optimists in the market is high enough they again can absorb the
security available at the market and bid the price up. In extreme case where
µˆ is high enough there is no short selling at all and only the most optimistic
investors determine the price.
Not only the ambiguity threshold is important for the equilibrium price
but also the distribution of agents within intervals. In the following we
analyze the impact of the change of the distribution of the agents along
[µ, µ]. For example, due to a unfavorable outcome caused by a shock some
agents that previously had the belief µi > µˆ may start to doubt their model
and become ambiguity averse while others keep the belief µi and remain
insensitive to ambiguity. More ambiguity on the market thus means in this
case, that although the ambiguity threshold remains constant, the mass of
ambiguity averse investors changes.
In this case the direction of the price change depends heavily on the shape
of the distribution of beliefs before and after the shock.
Lemma 13. Let P and Q be distributions on [µ, µ] with absolutely continuous
densities f , g. Assume that P and Q satisfy the hazard rate condition, i.e.
f(x)
1− F (x) ≤
g(x)
1−G(x) for all µ ≤ x ≤ µ (4.21)
i.e. P hr Q. Denote by pP resp. pQ the price on the market where the
agents are distributed according to P , Q resp. Then
1. pcP ≥ pcQ and
2. puP ≥ puQ
One could also think of an increase in ambiguity by means of an increase
of µ or decrease of µ. However this analysis is not meaningful without specific
assumptions on the underlying distribution m. For this reason we omit this
analysis here.
86
4.5. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
4.4.2 Sensitivity to changes of Q, γ, σ2
The standard market factors work in the usual direction decreasing the equi-
librium price.
Lemma 14. Denote by pu = µ + k∗(1 − M(µˆ)) − Qγσ2 the unrestricted
equilibrium price and by pc = µ+k∗− Qγσ2
1−M(µˆ) the restricted equilibrium price.
Then pu and pr satisfy
1. dp
u
dQ
< 0 and dp
c
dQ
< 0
2. dp
u
dγ
< 0 and dp
c
dγ
< 0
3. dp
u
dσ2
< 0 and dp
c
dσ2
< 0
These sensitivity results are in line with the standard theory and the
economics intuition carries over as well. Investors decrease their demands if
risk aversion resp. volatility increase, thus, as a result prices decrease as well.
Since this effects are well understood we keep the discussion short and omit
the proof.
4.5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
4.5.1 Uncertainty about volatility
In the generic model we assumed that all agents agree on the volatility of
the underlying asset. We can extend the model easily to the case with het-
erogeneous beliefs about volatility. The essence of result does not change
much.
Again agents in the economy differ in their beliefs about the return of
the asset. Assume that the asset is normally distributed according to (µ, σ)
where beliefs about the actual value of (µ, σ) are given by
P := {P : xP ∼ N (µ, σ2), s.t. (µ, σ2) ∈ [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2]}
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Every agent is endowed with a belief (µ, σ) from the above interval. The
set of all possible beliefs can be partitioned into two regions: an ambiguity
averse region A ⊂ [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2] and a subjective region S satisfying
A+ S = [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2].
All agents that have a belief in S maximize their subjective utility given
their belief while all agents in A maximize the minimal expected utility. The
distribution M of agents across the interval is now two dimensional and we
maintain the assumption that M has a density.
The analysis for the individual demand of an subjective utility investors
carries over from the single dimensional case and we get
dsi =
µi − p
γσ2i
(4.22)
resulting in aggregate demand
Ds =
∫
S
dsidm (4.23)
=
∫
S
µi − p
γσ2i
dm (4.24)
Using an appropriate version of the Mean Value Theorem we can show that
Ds = M(S) ·
(
µ∗ − p
γ(σ∗)2
)
The effect of heterogeneity in the volatility may either decrease or increase
the demand of SEU agents depending on the resulting average volatility σ∗.
For the demand of ambiguity averse investors we only need to note that
the highest variance minimizes their expected return. As in the standard
literature on ambiguity averse portfolio choice we then get
da =

µ−p
γσ2
if p < µ
0 if µ < p < µ
p−µ
γσ2
if p > µ
. (4.25)
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Similarly for the aggregate demand:
Da =
∫
A
max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
m(dµi) (4.26)
=M(A) max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(4.27)
Here, the uncertainty about the volatility reduces the demand of the ambigu-
ity averse agents. However, only the mean return is essential for the decision
to short sell or buy the asset. From this point on the model essentially re-
duces to the single dimensional case. In the same manner as above we can
perform the equilibrium analysis.
4.5.2 N ambiguous independent assets
Already Jarrow (1980) in his paper investigated the effect of adding securities
to Miller’s model. It turns out that the answer depends on the distribution
of assets. If the assets are correlated substitution effects influence demand
and prices of securities and the effect of short selling constraint may go in
both directions. However, if market participants agree on volatility of the
assets, the results of Miller (1977) carry over to the multiple asset case.
We can easily extend our model to the multiple asset case. In case of
independent assets the analysis does not change much. Due to independence
of assets and the form of the utility function the demand for each asset is
determined separately for SEU agents. The same holds true for ambiguity
averse agents. Thus, the price for each asset is set independently and the
equilibria can be analyzed one by one with the same technique as above.
However, we cannot distinguish anymore between unconstrained and con-
strained equilibria since some assets might be in the constrained equilibrium
while other in the unconstrained.
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4.5.3 Different distribution of preferences
In our model we assumed that all agents with belief more pessimistic than
the ambiguity threshold µˆ are not only pessimistic about returns of the stock
but also about the model they use. This assumption simplifies the analysis
considerably but is not essential for the result. The main result still holds
true if we relax the assumption that there are no SEU maximizer with a
belief more pessimistic than µˆ. In this case although ambiguity averse agents
still refuse to go short for prices within [µ, µ] SEU agents with pessimistic
belief can reflect their opinion by going short. However, the overpricing still
can occur if the short sell supply of pessimistic agents is not big enough to
offset the overoptimistic demand.
4.5.4 Market Crashes and Panics
The model we derived can also be used to explain panics and crashes. Those
can happen if heterogeneous agents become pessimistic and want to sell the
security causing a sell out of security. As in the optimistic case, ambiguity
averse refuse to correct this overreaction of the price due to their ambiguity.
In this way pessimistic agents can bring the prices to crash.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this Chapter we analyzed the impact of ambiguity on the equilibrium
price on markets with heterogeneous agents. Agents’ sensitivity to both risk
and uncertainty may impose short selling constraint on their portfolio. This
short selling constraint in turn affects the equilibrium price in an economy
with heterogeneous agents by increasing the equilibrium price. While the
effect of short selling constraint itself was already known, the Chapter ratio-
nalize the short selling constraint on markets through preferences. The model
considered here has also interesting implications for the regulation. After the
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beginning of the financial crisis a lively discussion has started on how to reg-
ulate the markets better in order to prevent investors to take huge risks and
to avoid bubbles. One of suggestions made by the theorists was to impose
a minimax regulation. Within this kind of regulations agents on the market
have to consider several models instead one when assessing riskiness to a
future payoff. The claim is then acceptable if its return is nonnegative un-
der all models the agents consider. This imposes a more conservative value
assignment preventing investors from excessive risk taking. However, this
kind of regulation can have side-effects highlighted in this Chapter. Agents
regulated in the above sketched way behave as ambiguity averse investors in
our model. If the regulation is imposed only locally they might be investors
on the global market who behave like SEU agents in our model. As we have
seen in the model such kind of interaction may lead to overpricing if beliefs
are heterogeneous. Thus, a minimax regulation although conservative form
of regulation may help to generate bubbles if it is not established in a careful
way.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
Within the three chapters of this thesis we have studied several problems
arising in the context of decision problems under Knightian uncertainty. Each
chapter discusses its respective topic in detail and ends with a conclusion
summarizing its results. Nevertheless for completeness we will briefly restate
our achievements at this point:
First, we modeled and analyzed the best choice problem under ambiguity.
We presented it in a way that allows to introduce ambiguity in the model
in an intuitive way and also covers a broader class of problems. The main
insight is that the optimal strategy of the problem under ambiguity has the
same structure as the problem under risk. The stopping rule is simple again.
However, the stopping here can occur later or earlier compared to the risky
problem. The reason for this is the non-measurability of the payoff obtained
from stopping.
In the third chapter of this work we analyze several exotic American
options in a discrete financial market under ambiguity. Here, the holder of
the option has to solve a multiple prior stopping problem in order to assign
value to the payoff and to determine her optimal strategy. Unlike many
examples analyzed in literature the payoffs we are considering cannot be
reduced to a single measure. The worst-case measures arising here are path-
dependent and change over time as the state process is realized. The reason
for this involved structure is path-dependency, the non-monotonicity or the
non-measurability of the considered payoff.
In the last chapter we change the perspective and consider a static finan-
cial market with heterogeneous investors. We show that when investors differ
in their beliefs and their attitude towards ambiguity an increase in ambiguity
can lead to a price increase. The reason for the lower premium paid in equi-
librium is that ambiguity averse agents leave the market and fail to generate
the short sale supply that is provided in the market by pessimistic agents.
The result suggests that the coherent risk regulation that is supported by
the scientific community as one of the lessons from the crisis can have side
effects on markets with heterogeneous agents.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix a stopping time τ with values in {1, . . . , N}. Our set of priors is
compact, hence we can choose Qk ∈ Q that minimize EPXk1{τ=k}. Time–
consistency of the set of priors implies that there exists a measure Q ∈ Q
such that
N∑
k=1
EQ
k
Xk1{τ=k} = EQ
N∑
k=1
Xk1{τ=k} = EQXτ ,
see, e.g., Lemma 8 in Riedel (2009). It follows that we have
inf
P∈P
EPXτ = inf
P∈P
EP
N∑
k=1
Xk1{τ=k} =
N∑
k=1
inf
P∈Q
EPXk1{τ=k} .
By applying the law of iterated expectations for time–consistent multiple
priors, this quantity is
=
N∑
k=1
inf
P∈P
EPZk1{τ=k}
and by applying time–consistency again, we get
= inf
P∈P
EPZτ .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To show the independence we have to show that
ess inf
P∈P
P (Y1 = y1, . . . , YN = yN) =
N∏
i=1
Pˆ (Yi = yi)
for a Pˆ ∈ P , yi ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Because of definition of P all events of above kind have positive probability
under every P ∈ P , i.e. P (Y1 = y1, . . . , YN = yN) > 0 for all sequences (yi)
with yi ∈ {0, 1} and all P ∈ P . Therefore, using Bayes’ rule and the fact
that one-step-ahead probabilities [an, bn] depend only on time we get
min
P∈P
P [Y1 = y1, . . . , YN = yN ] = min
P∈P
P [YN = yN |FN−1]P [Yi = yi, i < N ]
= min
P∈P
N∏
n=1
P [Yn = yn|Fn−1]
=
N∏
n=1
min
xn∈[αn,βn]
Pxn [Yn = yn|Fn−1]
=
N∏
n=1
min
xn∈[αn,βn]
Pxn [Yn = yn]
where Pxn denotes the measure defined via Pxn [Yn = yn|Fn−1] = xn.
In the last part of the equation we used the fact that the worst one-step-ahead
probabilities depends only on time and not on the realization ω ∈ Ω.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The value process of the stopping problem for the payoff process (Xn)
is given via
Ut = ess sup
τ≥t
EQ[Xτ |Ft] (A.1)
= sup
τ≥t
EQ[Yτ ·Bτ |Y1, ·, Yt] (A.2)
= sup
τ≥t
EQ[Yτ ·Bτ ] (A.3)
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=vt (A.4)
Having established the independence we can conclude that the sequence vt
is nonincreasing as the set of the arguments decreases. On the other hand,
the sequence (Bn) is increasing and we get using the principle of backward
induction Using this monotonicity observation we can conclude that if it is
optimal to stop at Now suppose that it is optimal to take a candidate r. We
have then Br = vr; therefore, we get
Br+1 ≥ Br = vr ≥ vr+1 ,
and it is also optimal to stop when a candidate appears at time r + 1. We
conclude that optimal stopping rules are simple.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We denote by wγn the sequence corresponding to the problem with the
level of ambiguity γ. Straightforward calculations show that
wγn =
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1
N∏
l=n
(
1 +
1− γ2
lγ − 1
)
(A.5)
To prove robustness we first show
e−
1
γ ≤ r
∗
γ
N
≤ e− 2γ1+γ + 3
N
(A.6)
For the left-hand side of A.6:
wγn =
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1
N∏
l=n
(
1 +
1− γ2
lγ − 1
)
≥
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1 (A.7)
≥
N∑
k=n
γ
k
(A.8)
≥
∫ N
n
γ
k
dk (A.9)
= γ log
(
N
n
)
(A.10)
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For the threshold rγ we obtain
1 = wγn ≥ γ log
(
N
n
)
(A.11)
⇔ (A.12)
r∗γ
N
≤ e− 1γ (A.13)
For the second inequality:
wγn =
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1
N∏
l=n
(
1 +
1− γ2
lγ − 1
)
=
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1 exp
(
k−1∑
l=n
ln
(
1 +
1− γ2
lγ − 1
))
≤
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1 exp
(
k−1∑
l=n
1− γ2
lγ − 1
)
≤
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1 exp
(∫ k
l=n−1
1− γ2
lγ − 1dl
)
≤
N∑
k=n
γ2
kγ − 1
(
kγ − 1
(n− 1)γ − 1
) 1−γ2
γ
Using α := 1−γ
2
γ
− 1 we obtain for γ ≥ 0.5
wγn ≤
∫ N
n−1
γ2
((n− 1)γ − 1)α+1 (kγ − 1)
α dk
≤ γ
2
1− γ2
[(
N
n− 3
)α+1
− 1
]
By setting wγn = 1 we get
1 ≤ γ
2
1− γ2
[(
N
n− 3
)α+1
− 1
]
⇔
97
n− 3
N
≤ γ 2γ1−γ2
≤ exp
(
ln(γ)
2γ
1− γ2
)
≤ exp
(
(γ − 1)2γ
1− γ2
)
≤ e− 2γ1+γ
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Because of boundedness of w∞ there exists a R ∈ N, s.t.
∞∑
k=n
βk
k−1∏
l=1
αl ≤ 1 for all n ≥ R
and it follows that
r∗(N) ≤ R for all N
and
r∗(N)
N
≤ R
N
→ 0 for N →∞
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Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We give proof for decreasing A in St for all t ≤ T . The second case
works similarly. For notational simplicity we write ω(t) for an element in⊗t
i=1{0, 1} ⊆ Ω. Furthermore, for a stopping time τ we introduce for each
t ≤ T the restriction τ t of τ to paths in Ω running up to time t:
τ t :
t⊗
i=1
{0, 1} −→ [0, t] ∪ {T + 1}
ω(t) 7−→ τ t(ω(t)) =
τ(ω(t)), if τ(ω(t)) ≤ tT + 1, if else .
The restricted stopping are being used in order to be mathematically more
exact.
We start the proof with
Lemma 15. Let (UQt )t≤T be the multiple prior Snell envelope of X as defined
in Theorem 6. Assume that UQt is given by the function u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) for all
t ≤ T . Then for all t ∈ [0, T − 1] and all k ∈ [1, T − t]
u(t, S, t, T + 1) ≥ u(t+ k, S, t+ k, T + 1).
Proof. The inequality follows directly by the inequality
u(t, S, t, T + 1) ≥ u(t+ k, S, t, T + 1) = u(t+ k, S, t+ k, T + 1).
The inequality always holds for claims of American style whose payoff does
only depend on the underlying’s price S at each time. For the special choice
of τ t1 and τ
t
2 it therefore also holds for the considered claims of the theorem.
The equality holds since the claim is already knocked-in.
Using theory of multiple prior Snell envelope, see Riedel (2009), we show
by backwards induction that UQt = u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) for all t such that u has the
following properties:
(i) for t < τ t1 : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·))↗ in S ≤ S¯1,
where S¯1t is determined by τ
t
1(S¯
1) = t
(ii) for t ∈ [τ t1, τ t2[ : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·))↘ in S
(iii) for t ≥ τ t2 : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·)) = 0 for all S.
First, note that u is well-defined due to the definition of the payoff process
X. (u complies with the definition of a function since Xt which only depends
on St, τ
t
1, and τ
t
2, does for each t ≤ T .) For t = T we have
UQT (·) = XT (·) = 1[τT1 ,τT2 [(T, ·) A(T, ST (·))
=
0, if τT1 = T + 1 or τT2 ≤ TA(T, ST ), if τT2 = T + 1 and T ≥ τT1
=
0 = u(T, ST , τT1 , τT2 ) ∀ST , if τT1 = T + 1 or τT2 = TA(T, ST ) = u(T, ST , τT1 , T + 1) ∀ST , if τT1 ≤ T < τT2 .
So, UQT satisfies the representation and the properties by the assumptions on
XT , A(T, ·), respectively.
In the induction step for t < T we handle the different cases separately. First,
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assume t ∈ [τ t1, τ t2[ , say τ t1(ω(t)) =: k ≤ t: Then
UQt (ω(t)) = max
{
Xt(ω(t)),min
P∈Q
[Ut+1|Ft(ω(t))]
}
(IH)
= max
{
Xt(ω(t)), min
pt+1∈[p,p]{
pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ
t+1
2 (ω(t), 1)) + (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, k, τ t+12 (ω(t), 0))
}}
.
By induction hypothesis and due to τ t+12 (ω(t), 0) ≥ τ t+12 (ω(t), 1), properties
(ii) and (iii) for t+ 1 imply
u(t+ 1, Std, k, τ
t+1
2 (ω(t), 0)) ≥ u(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ t+12 (ω(t), 1)). Therefore,
UQt (ω(t)) = max
{
Xt(ω(t)), pu(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ
t+1
2 (Stu)) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, k, T + 1)
}
= Uˆt(ω(t)).
Hence, in this case UQt is a function u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) which is decreasing in
S since A(t, ·) is decreasing in S by assumption, and u(t + 1, ·, k, τ t2(·)) is
monotone decreasing in S by induction hypothesis (property (ii), (iii), re-
spectively).
Second, if t ≥ τ t2(ω(t)) =: l < T, and τ t1(ω(t)) =: k < l:
UQt (ω(t)) = max
{
Xt(ω(t)), min
pt+1∈[p,p]
(pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, k, l) + (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, k, l))}
= 0,
since Xt(ω(t)) = 0 by assumption and u(t + 1, ·, k, l) = 0 by induction hy-
pothesis (property (iii)).
Third, assume the case t < τ t1(ω(t)) = T + 1:
Then Xt = 0 and therefore we get in the first case when τ
t+1
1 (ω(t), 1) = T + 1
UQt (ω(t)) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
{
pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, τ
t+1
1 (ω(t), 1), T + 1)
+(1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, τ t+11 (ω(t), 0), T + 1)
}
= pu(t+ 1, Stu, T + 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)
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by induction hypothesis (property (i)). Hence, pt+1 = p and u(t, ·, T+1, T+1)
is increasing in S.
In the second case when τ t+11 (ω(t), 1) = t+ 1:
UQt (ω(t)) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
{pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)}
= pu(t+ 1, Stu, t+ 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)
= u(t, St, T + 1, T + 1)
again by induction hypothesis (property (i) since St · u = S¯1) and we obtain
pt+1 = pτ t+11 = p. In order to show the monotonicity note that by induction
hypothesis (property (i)) the last expression is greater or equal to
pu(t+ 1, St, T + 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Stdd, T + 1, T + 1) which again is
equal to u(t, Std, T + 1, T + 1) (see the first case).
Thus, for showing property (i) we just have to prove that u(t, S¯1, t, T + 1) ≥
u(t, S¯1d, T + 1, T + 1). Using property (i) of induction hypothesis we obtain
u(t, S¯1d, T + 1, T + 1) = pu(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− p)u(t+ 1, S¯1 · d2, T + 1, T + 1)
≤ pu(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− p)u(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
= u(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
≤ u(t, S¯1, t, T + 1).
The last inequality is due to Lemma 15. This completes the proof and (UQt )
satisfies the same recursion as (Uˆt). Thus, (U
Q
t ) = (Uˆt) follows and the
worst-case measure Pˆ is specified by the density DˆT as claimed.
An optimal stopping time is given by τˆ . This follows by general theory,
see Riedel (2009). The time boundary σ of the optimal stopping rule is due
to the claim’s knock-out feature.
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B.2 Downcrossing Times Theorem
A result similar to Theorem 6 also holds for downcrossing times. The only
difference is the monotonic behavior of X and U which changes for down-
crossing times. As a consequence, the densities of the worst-case measures
change. So, we will state the theorem without giving the proof since it would
be almost a copy of of the above proof.
Theorem 7. Take the same assumptions as in Theorem 6 except the one
for τ1 and τ2 being now either down-crossing times or constant again. Thus,
assume S0 > H1 > H2.
1. If A(t, ·) is decreasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ2: u6=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t: u=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u∈ ]τ2, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T and all occurring 1 ≤ i ≤ T . An optimal stopping rule
under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
2. If A(t, ·) is increasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u∈ ]τ1, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T. An optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 12
The proof is simple calculations. For the first part we get
pu =
[∫ µ
µˆ
µi ·m(µi)dµi
]
· (1−M(µˆ)) + µ ·M(µˆ)−Qγσ2
and thus
dpu
dµˆ
= −m(µˆ)µˆ+m(µˆ)µ < 0
For the second part we get
pc =
[∫ µ
µˆ
µi ·m(µi)dµi
]
−Qγσ2/(1−M(µˆ))
and thus for the derivative
dpc
dµˆ
= −µˆ ·m(µˆ)(1−M(µˆ)) +m(µˆ) ((µ+ k∗)(1−M(µˆ))−Qγσ2) /(1−M(µˆ))2
Now since µˆ < µ+ k∗ we get the desired inequality.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. We first consider the restricted equilibrium price defined in (4.16)
pc =
∫ µ
µˆ
µ · f(µ)dµ−Qγσ2/(1− F (µˆ))
=EP (µ|µ > µˆ)− Qγσ
2
1− F (µˆ)
Since P hr Q we know that
EP (µ|µ > µˆ) ≥ EQ(µ|µ > µˆ)
and
(1− F (µˆ)) ≥ (1−G(µˆ))
which implies the result.
Now to the second part: From (4.16) we know that the price in the
unrestricted equilibrium is given by
pu =M(µˆ) · µ+
∫ µ
µˆ
µ ·m(µ)dµ−Qγσ2 (C.1)
=
∫ µ
µˆ
(µ− µ) ·m(µ)dµ− (Qγσ2 + µ) (C.2)
where M denotes the distribution of agents and m its density. Now consider
the prices on the market with distributions P and Q. Since (4.21) implies
the first order stochastic dominance we get∫ µ
µˆ
(µ− µ) · f(µ)dµ ≤
∫ µ
µˆ
(µ− µ) · g(µ)dµ
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